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The machinery for weighing or

,,

measuring the popular will from week
to week, or month to month has not
been, and is not likely to be, invented.

Lord Bryce
The American Commonwealth
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PRE:H1ACE

.Peering into the tomes of history in
an attempt to better comDrehend the

~;lerican

mind during this cr:Ltical period of our history, the author has encountered many conflicting and ambiguous

state;~nts.

But by CO.:.11pa:cing

these opinions and by a detailed study of origina 1

30

urces the author has endeavored. to reach

logical grounds for his reasoning.
The opinions here oifered agree with
those of others used, but only because the
author through diligent study has arrived at
like conclusions.
That his own

historic~l

integrity has

not been jeopardized by his faith in others is
the author's sincere hope.

V1ALTER

University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky
Ootober 10, 1949
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I • .A D3FHHTION OF

PU3LI~

OPI:nOH

When dealing with peonle,
let us remember we are not dealing wIth creatl,res of logic. We
are dealing w:i th crea t ) ; :tes of emo~
tion, creatL:.res bustling with prejudices and motivated with pride
and vanity.
Dale Carnegie
iIow t o;'lin Friends

( "

,

There are many reasons why the role of propaganda,
in shaping public opinion in international politics and especially in war time, is receiving more careful scrLctiny today
then heretofore.

~ie

live among peonle who are puzzled more

than ever, uneasy and vexed at the unknown cunning wnich seems
to have d.uped and ta.t::en advantage of their implic it faith in
what they read, see and hear. Little wonder that there is a
1

new suspicion and inc:uisitiveness abroad in the world.
Public opinion may.be the label for a pseudo-scienti fic concept ion. It is also a catch-phrase
power that has
of

refor~ners

~een

o~·

great popular

worn smooth and non-descript by generations

and politicians. Public opinion and the american

ideal of the freed03 01 the press are inextricably and peculiarly woven together in our historY • .J.'his contributes to the
diffic ul ties in dhltinguishing between public opinion and the
press.
Public opinion is a vocalization of the attitudes of
individuals concerned with particular controversial issues.
Such openly expressed attitudes are found in co;:aplex soci eties
which permi t and enco urage argumen:;s and discussions as an essential met:nod of arriving at either a provisional or a final
settlement of matters of vital moment to the citizenry. There
are, to be sure, many publics functioning in a society; one,
1

Lasswell, Harold D.: Propaganda rechnique in the World War,
p. 2.

-1-

\.

I
as it were, for ever/ controversy whieh arises and attracts
the attention of a sizeable number 0::' followers. Obviously
many of these gro upings overlap. Furthe rmore, in our kind of
culture the opihions of these social groups are important.
Pu1;J li c opinion may tnen be defined as a collection of indio

vid ual opinions represent ing a range of soc ial gro ups on a
subject of general interest on which there is no unanimous
1

agreement.
Again public opiniQn is based

prir~rily

upon the

culture of the various groups with w.l'dch the members are affiliated. Since controversial issues usually involve a conflict of grpup interests, attitudes towards a c ontrover~~;y are
in a large meas ure determined by the speCial groups to livhich
the individua'l belongs. 'l'hus in controversies, opinions becorne ir:celevant and confused by the fact that the different
groups to which the individuals belong have a variety of not ions as to the rela t i ve importance of a certain iss ue. 30c ial
attitudes, folkways or cultures are

CO~TInon

factors in the mind-

sets of those involved. They p:ce.)are the ::linds of group members
to deal wi th the various classes of problems from numerous
points of view. And we must remember, too, that the tempo of
our culture does not easily prepare us to see all sides of a
question. Of any 'lublie event we see at first only a single '
1

Lippman, Walter: Public Opinion, p. 3.
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facet of it. Our picture of it is controlled in part by those
who transmit knowledge' to us'about it. If the event is of secret or semi-secret status, and if little information is available on it, the picture which

ta~(es

pl9..ce in the mind is dis-

torted at once. i:'urthermore as one attempts to fill in the gaps
on the basis of insufficient data in order to 'complete the picture the resulting imaginings then become known as stereotypes,
and a stereotype may be, said to
torted and rationalized
l

conc~pt

be~simplified and often a dis-

of

a group of persons, insti-

tution, or situation.
When

~

iss ue ari ses and a cit izen for:llS an opinion

about it, he seldom has the ti:ne, interest, or technical skill
need.ed to garner the facts and the whole st ory about it even
in favorable circumstances when essential facts are available.
Instead there is likely to be too ready a reliance upon his
personal

aoc~

uired stereotypes to give him his cue. To be sure

he knows something about the matter at hand. But that something
is likely to be a stereotyped set of f31leged facts steeped in
unrecognized prej udices surrounding them. Too often these suffice. Consequently stereotypes simplify the complex world we
live in and make it seem cOHlprehcnsible and manageable and progressive. Stereotypes function also unW':l:cily as defense and
escape mechanisms inoculating us against the
1

Ibid.) p. 81.
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unco~llfortable

\:

neoessity of ohanging our minds.
Yet this world in wh ioh we live is not neoessar ily the
world we want it to be. It is simply the .l,cind of a world we know
ani. vbioh we readily beoome oontented v.ith, adjlJ..sted to, and offfuard may inevitably exneot it t

0

be. For after '3.11 this stereo-

type kind of a world saves us time and might even beoome what
might be desoribed as a handy intelleotual.tool if we are not
oonstantly on our guard. It tends als 0 to preserve us from the
hustl$ and bustle and oonfusi.on of a bewildering world and aids.
us in f inding pat so lut ions topers ona I and pub.lio pr oblems almost instanteo usly 'v'iithout provooa t ion. Yes', our opinions are influenoed by the folkways, and the mores and the morals of the
world or worlds whioh surround us and of which we are members
and whioh we permit to become our own ::J.oralizLd and :tationalized codifioation of facts along with an inolination to be too
1

prone to aooept at faoe value.
Public ouinion has often been generated and cO[:lmilnioated by two extre111e

c.

altern t ing met :ods. One, the

~D:olioa t

ion of

physioal foroe and, two, the method of pers uasion through the use
of symbols as illustrated by the wr it ten and spoken word. The
resort to the use of physioal foroe as a method by whioh a group
is a ompelled to be lieve some thing is so alien to the 1f.d.m6rioan
I

Ibid" p. 126.
-4-

way" that it can be di smissed at once. 'rhe assistance of. the
alternavive method is therefore seized upon to d'o the "trick."
In the

d~dllf'ul

enlistment of this latter method ulterior motives

do not corae under suspicion. The applicat ion of this unsuspected
ruse is orderly, painless a'fa. pres mllub ly gives evidence of a respect for the personality of those appealed to. Prostitute the
language lito this thinglt you want to "get across" and that will
take care of it. It will also help to dramatize it, pantomiJile it,
parade it, surrounu it with r.itual and audio-visual sugar-coated

\

broadcast alld brochure.
Language is the chief means for shaping public opinion
and the clever use of it

beco.~s

the mOi3t reliable method for

winning converts to a particular po'int of view wi thout arousing
emotional recoil • .tUnerican newspapers in the first two decades
of the twentieth centL,ry illustrate the truth of this claim as
an incontestable means in both moulding and controlling the minds
of their readers .v/hen it is, realized they comprised the only
1

readinE::: material for ninet,? per cent of the it.lerican people
during this peri od we sense immedia tely the power that they
wielded over the minds'

0

f men, wi th each new ·-·edi ti on suppress ing

or playing up pet angles in behalf of a capitalistic order which
might need a little lipruning" or "tl'il.11ming" here and there) but

1
Peterson, H. C.: Propaganda for War-- rhe Campaign against
Alllerican Heutrfo.lity. 1914-1917 t p. 7.
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not very much)in order to uBher in the utopia j uSb ahead. 'l'hus
have the owners and the hirelings of the press been guilty of
finding ways of applying a self-imposed censorship by which they
could preserve the stat us-quo, protect their vested interests
and the monopolies of their friends and followers who approved
their maneuvers. Here we have, of course, nothing less than a
.

deliberate atte.:l1ptto propagandize and

bamboo~le

1

the readers.

It is likewise well known that co rrespondents and editors are human beings and are conseeouently inclined to color the

\
I

news accordillg to their own ideas. It would be too much to expect
them not to do so. Ni th these two classes
can

disti~guish

0

f wr it ers in mind we

two so-called brands of censorship; 1. The aelib-

erste sup )ression- of facts while

preten:.~ing

to give complete news

cove:cae;:e and 2. the unintentional circumvel:Jting <?f them. '[e
have here what fllight be called then the two chief tools at the
disposal of propagandists. lmd. If.e DUSt hasten to add that there
are many times when the unconscious influences operatillg are mOl'e
effective than the deliberate efforts to produce the coveted
2
ends.
The three queBtions which are posed for us in the seque:nce are: 1. Is the information fed to us distorted or not?; 2.
1

Lasswell,

OPe

cit., p. 38.

2

Riegel, hobert E. and others;
SCiences, p. 1078.

An
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Introduction to the Social

Can we judge satisfactorily the motives behind the news presented.?;
and 3. Is the news distorted deliberately or unintentionally?
Such que,ctions imply the priLKl.ry reasons why propaganda provides
no satisfactory guide to one who desires to weigh honestly a..l1d
Beriously the reliability of the inforraation and the arguments
uded to bolster up the news

ad~~linis tered.

PI' opaganda as such, over

and over again, beco::'16s little more than a synonym for "lie. 1I
Consider aB well that p::copaganda is s orne times defined
to rooan the
{

pl.·e~-5entation

of one side as against the giving of

both sides. But is it right for one to teacp. what he believes
at long last to bs untrue or dangerous? Such a defini ti on may be
requiring that one should do the very thing he is later condemned
for doing. In other words. is it not true that at times one is
obligded to distort the news fed to him in order to teach the
truth? But be that as it may the word propaganda still remains
a wo rd to be used to di scredi t the information and arguments with
which one disagrees. Nor will it be amiss to recall that the word
is used to describe the entrance of ulterior motives. In short,
the VJord is inextricably intertwined with all information and
activities, oral, written and pictorial, designed to influence and
inflame another person's opinion or 'actions, and honestly requires
the admissiontha tall definit ions of the word are often too academia for the many, since the few, have tODoften no scale of
values other than those connoted by the words "good" and "bad."
Consequent ly) "propaganda, If because of the uncertaint ies

involved pertaining to the ordinary accepted virt ues. beco:nes
a s:near word standing for something unreliable, sanething if you
please, Which one does not want to have dealings with. It is a
word in ill repute. It is used to discredit proposals, motives
and actions of people with whom one, for one or more reasons,
disagrees. Thus people rarely admit or consider themselves to be
propagandists or the things that they think, say, wri te and do
1

to be propaganda.
An infallable meth,?d of measuring and s u:l1marizing
/

\

public opinion has not as yet been perfected althoGgh many are
the gestures made in this direction by individuals or organiza ..
tions in which a pure precipitate of public opinion is vi tal to
their interest. The staterrent of the leader of'the group may be
the opinion of the majority represented, but it is seldom the
2

opinion of ever;y'one in the group.
There are incidents of the past which see:! to prove
conclusively that one hypnotic leader, without/tile
enlistment of
.'
,

what is referred to as scientific analysiS (especially in the'
field of politics) senses the pulse of public opinion sooner and
more accurately than the application of the most scientifio methods known to-date. It is also possible that leadership of this
kind might be used to swing people into line and on to the band1

Riegel and others; Ope oit., pp. 1080-1082.
2

Lippman, OPe cit., p. 3.
-8-

wagon totally unaware of what they are headed for. In this form
the one-sided spokesman of a sEnall

seg,~lent

of the populat ion may

be knowingly or unknowingly a Iftoolll of the propagandist.
The rise of publi<;: opinion as a significant TlOlitical
and Bocial force dates back to the eighteenth century. It is
closely identified with the rise of lIlia.dle-class democracy. In
due time it became a fetish, blossoming out in the

expandir~

grasp of democratic; desires to impregnate the minds of the peoples
of Western Eu::,'ope and Ameri0B: during the last two hundred years.
Other familiar associates are: nrogress, freedom of the press,
freedom of asse:-oo ly, freedom of speech and freedom of- religion.,
Of these, freedom of the press and freedom of public opinion are
intimately linked together in the ir history and tilis interrelatedness contributes toone of the di ffitulties in d.ist inguishing
between public opinion and the "news. 11 Wi tb the rise of the printing and newspaper industries it was but a short dtep for newspaper proprietors to proclaim that their journals reflected the
I
II

pub lic int erest • tI
To repeat, the opinion of a Single newspaper does not

reflect the opinion of - the hoi-polloi. It may be the opinion of
the owner, edi tor or correspondent or the opinion of that small
segment of the publio Which is vitally interested in the newspapers cont inuance and the furthe ring of vested interests known
or unknown.

a

survey by a newspaper, in the period under consld-

I

vVilson, Logan and Kolb, William: Sociological.Analysis, (Lee,
alfred McClung, Public Opinion in Relation to Culture) p. 310
-9-

eration refleoted, for example, only a rough approximation of
pub lio opinion at best, but

l!Q~,

for, at that time we had

no device for measuring the opinion of a whole nation's population with any degree of acouracy. Neither did the surveys suoh as
those conducted by the Literary Digest reflect , the concerted
opinion of the entire country when they were rrade. They often
.,-f

only reflected opinions of iifferent newspapers through~the nation. And, to be sure, there is the remlote possi1Jility that the
indi vidual newspaper reflected the correct opinion of the whole
area to which it catered, but the chance of this be ing the case
was very slight • .Again there is the possibility that the newspaper was powerful enough to form and control pub lic opinion wi th;..
in a certain area at a certain

time~

due to the fact, let us say.

for example, that the newspaper comprised. the sole reading material for ninety per cent of the American people during the period,
1
1914-1917. jut such conclusions are subject to correction.
The polls undertaken by the Literary

~igest

during the

above mentioned periOd of our neutrality were forerunners of our
more elaborate polls today. Then, there was no breaking down of
the population into classes,

either.econoillical~y

or socially.

"dhen the general public was polled the list of names came either
from the Digest's own mailing list or from the telephone directory
or some other more or less comparable listing. Hor did the poll
consider the full range o;f possible opinions in a complex soc'iety and whether these ideas had been jelled to the place
1

Peterson, OPe cit., p. 7.
-10-

where they could be said to be based on abiding cOllvic;;ions. i3esides the opinions recorded from such polls were too few in number, too shallow in depth and consec_uently -altogetner unreliable.
nowever,

\;.I.1e inaccuracy of th ese polls st. QuId not be charged to

a false accounting of the organization conducting the poll. In
the case of the Literary Dig-est it must be remembered, in fairness,
that the magazine was atte:llpting to break rew ground and to secure
a \'l/hole mtion's opinion with the only known instrument at hand.
In this case the editer was not a social scientist or a politician
but a business man intent on trying to devise a sound method of
polling the na.tion to detect its pulse for the benefit of the
readers of his magazine. This step

mar.,.~ed

the birth of that which

has since develpped into what we now believe to be a "scientific
instrument, ff even though the public opinion polls in vogue today
1

likeVJise have their weaknesses.
The more or less scientifio poll of today however takes
oognizanoe of the ideological differences that have come to play
s uoh a tremenduous role in American politics, and today' s authorities in this new endeavor realize the potential danger here and
are now engaged in experimenting vvith more and more reliable tools
oapab Ie of me as ur~ng the intensi ty and breadth of t he opinions
held. The progress that has been rrade through the use of batteries of related questions have shown that "frames of reference ••
•.[." • relatively
firmly rooted" in I1personal values" are credited
"-':
~

~'.e:

1

i1ilson and Kolb, OPe ci t., p. 321.
-11-

wi th obtaining

fI

essentia lly th e sam:; results" from di fferent

types of questioning from different points of view. Suoh an elaboration of the questioning provess may lead eventually to a reliable reoording of the sentiments involved and a reoognition of
the important part they play in a more inolusive tabulation of
publio opinion • .And it is a long step between the expression of
a sooially aooeptable tolerant opinion and literally being more
oonsiderate of another's religious and raoial loyalties in the
1
gi ve and take of everyday Ii ~ ng.
30 despite the knowledge that no instruments were available in 1914 to gauge aoourately the opinion of the

.A,l;.1erio~n

people we are reasonably safe in saying tbat at the outbreak of
the European. struggle they favored a polioy of

De

utrality. They

seenBd dete:tmined to stand by that polioy. Having said this we
must also readily admit that there is no short out to the arriving
at suoh a oonclusion in an effort to disobver why the American
people,

d~testing

war and in favor of staying out of it, did

enter it. Here emerges the neoessity for looking at the sooial,
eoonomio, and religi OUB s ouroes and oauses, stereotypes and
ideologies if we would, know and be assisted in solving the problemsoonfronting us today.

1
Loo. oit.

..0.
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II. THE COURSE AIID ACTIO.N OF ]lURE IGN PnO P.AGAl1D.a.

Secti on one: The theo ry of propaganda.
Section two: Reality.

Let any man speak long
enough, he will get believers.
Stevenson
The

l~ster

of Ballantrae

~HEORY

The· aot of persuasion, known today as the art of propagandizing, is as old as history but it was not until the present
oentury that it beoame known as an art or trad.e. In the oomplex
world of today we are oontinuallyatter.apting to "swing" votes
and power to our own trend of thought and the use of propaganda
is now very aOmffionplaoe. The use of Jropaganda to indootrinate
and to proseo ute a war has made it an everyday term.
There are basio fundamentals that must be follo .. ed in
all propaganda. One is to . adhere to the truth as olose as possible.
Another basic idea is to arouse the interest of speo ifio groups
and a third is to nullify inoonvenient ideas, always remembering
too,that to seoure a wide appeal one should use~straight-forward
manner or style. It shoc,ld be written or spoken in a simple style
so that it may be understood by. thE: "man on the dooks, or the peddler on the street oorner. ff Paul Goebbels stated that propaganda
must always be essentially Simple and repetitious, for in the long
run the suooessful propagandist is the person who is able to
"reduoe problems to the simplest term8 and who has the co urage to
keep forever repeating ·them in this simplified form desnite the
1
objeotions of the intelleotuals."
Thestrategio aims or four major objeotives of Allied
propaganda were:
1

The Goebbels Diaries, p. 119.

1. To mobilize hatred against the enemy.
2. To preserve the friendship of Allies.
3. To preserve the friendship, and if
possible, to procure the cooperation of neutrals.
4. To demoralize tile enemy. 1
1'0 mobilize hatred against an enemy the propagandist must

first accuse him of being quarrelsome, crude and destructive. He
is degenerate in his conduct of the war and conducts a lying propaganda. Then call him l:allleS and pic ture what the worl d wo uld be like
if the enemy did happen to be victorious. The war can also be represented as a war of race or as a holy war. The enemy invariably
mobilizes first against a defenseless nation, ei ther openly or
secretly, and cor.ami ts acts of war. The enemy further incriminates
himself by endeavouring to maneuver our government into the position of an aggressor and by dOing this he stands on a record
of lawlessness, violence and malice, which offers unassaiLl.ble
proof of a deliberate

int~nt

to maim or destroy our great nation.

'To further his cause ani build up this hatred the propagandist
attemtps to convince the public that his nation has entered the
struggle to save business, family and church, and to add to prosperity, security and faith. Thus the enemy becomes the enemy of
2

each and everyone of us.
Similar tactics can be used regarding allies, with whom
ties of friendship should be preserved. The nropagandato bring
1

Lasswell,

OPe

cit., p. 195.

2

Ibid, pp. 47-70.

-14-

this about ma¥ incluue constant assertions of respect and demonstrations of esteem, such as observing the allies' chief holidays. In seeking to influence ne utrals the propagandist must
introduce to the neutral the idea that his enemy is the neutral's
enemy, ana. thus get the neutral to identify himself with the war
1

aims of the propagandist.
The demoralizing of the ene,llY is chiefly accomplished,
of course, by defeating him in the field. But the propagandist's
part is to convince a nation that its troops are wavering. Leaf-

('

lets and other printed propaganda way have little effect, but
when one's own na ti on I a events mai::e propaganda read as a lie,
2
national demoralization sets in.
It must be emphasized that a group ca mot be sure that
its efforts will

accomplis~

the desired results, as propaganda

has definite limitations. The willingness of the people to believe,
brought ab out by other influences in their environment which have
been so strong that their thifucing patterns are set, destroys its
3
effectiveness. Finally, its effects are limited by counter-propaganda, whicn may be considered as t he pI' opaganda of the opposing
4
',.

faction.

Propaganda is alsO limited in its inability to control

1

Ibid, pp. 114-1260
2

Peterson, OPe cit., preface.
3

Riegel, h. E., OPe cit., p. 1087.
4

Ogburn, :'li11iam F. and Nimkoff, :leyer F.: Sociology, p. 298.
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Page 16
Missing from the
original thesis

Page 16
Missing from the
original thesis

lists of

w~r

aims were pointed largely at home aUdiences but
1

such stater.1ents were a1so intended to influence neutra.l opinion.
The various classes of Al1Erican society bad to be influenced but
without antagonizing other classes. Social reform may be held out
to wage-earners but middle-class people are likely to give their
approval to war aims of a political or juristic character.
nlfthe problem of reconstructing
t he world is to be shorn of al,l...apparen t
class bias, it must be concefived as a
problem of a politico-juristic nature,
for talk ab out world 19 gi sla t ures and
courts tends to ingratiate itself where
proposals for the administration of raw
na terials by wor Id act .Lon, and for the
use of the world taxing power to level
up existing inequalities of opportunity
are suspect." 2
The League to

En~orce

Peace (1914-1919) is the best

example of this branch of su ccess ful pro paganda (to ar ise dur ing
the peri od of our ne utrali ty.
The active propagandist is certain to have a helping
hand from everybody with an axe to grind. Those groups who do
not take action imrnediately can be b:.:'ought into the realm of
the propagandist gradually,without their direct knowledge, by
bringing to light those things which are of special interest to
the group. To the economic and ecclesiastical groups already
referred

10

could be added a constellation of artists, SCientists,

teachers, or sportsmen wi thout end. The memb ers of the talka ti ve
1

Lasswell,

Ope

cit., p. 59.

2

Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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professions who depend for their living on their ability to arouse
emot ions are pract ically ind ispensable.
Slowly but surely the successful propagandist brings
his

~ uspecting

vict iml'into the realm of imagining himself in

the cold cruel war via /one way or another. ite must remember that
most peo ple are more int erested in themse Ives than in anything
else in the world. 30 when the propagandist has involved the
public in the struggle to the extent that the vvelfare of the person depends on the outcome of the war, following the general
1

pattern placed before him, the propagandist has succeeded •.
For a meJuber of the general public who has been victimized this way it proves exceedingly hard to trace the connection
between the responsible authorities and their propaganda. When
drastic action by t he government fo llows a heavy outpouring of
propaganda and the officials are questioned as to their authority
for such action, they may contend that the pressure of pub lie
opinion forced their hand.

~hus

it is a vicious circle once again;

.2

one a slave to the other.

So far as there are formula tions of

public opinion, legal rules cannot exist until public opinion
has become fixed and settled, and cannot we 11 change unti 1 p!).blic
opinion has

~efinitely

changed. It follows that law is likely to

1

Lippman, Ope cit., p. 178.
2

Jiead, JallB s l.iorgan: Atr oc ity Propaganda, p. 17.
-18-

-

lag somewhat behind publio opinion whenever the latter is aotive
1
and growing. Thus the· neoessi ty arises for the government to
mould the opinion of the publio until the publio demands that the
measures proposed by the authorities are nade law.
The suooessful propagandist is the one who oan create
oonfusion among his vict.Lms and out of this confusion mould their
minds to do his hidding In an unsuspecting manner. He must be
careful not to let the confusion lead to mob-violenoe where this
might oause antagonism to all that he is attem1ting to create in
their minds. Dividing thei r thoughts and then conqueri ng them by
direoting their thoughts into the channel he has prepared/is his
2

main attaok.

Mobs can also oreate fear and thus be good propa-

ganda at times.
The minds of the general pub lio must be made to justify
tlleir part in the struggle. This is brought about by the general
wish of

c

11 mankind that good be trIumphant in the universe. It

must. therefore, be that one's own m. tion is vindioating the
right against the wrong. In the veryaot of delivering the blow
the nation oalls for unity and viotory. It is the business of
the propagandist to amplify and repeat the call. Then as right
makes might, the mind assumes the idea that we are struggling
with the .enemy in the name of peace and seourity. This is the
1

Ford, James: Social Problems and Sooial Polioy, p. 897.
2

Gillette and Reinhardt. Ope oit •• p. 643.
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greatest war aim and in it the pllb lic finds the "peaceflllness of
1
b e i l1g a t war. f1
"When the pllblic belie ves that the
ereroy began the war and blocks a permanent, profitably and godly peace, the
propagandist has achieved his sllpreme
p Ilrp os e. tf 2

-0-

1

Lasswell,

OPe

cit., pp. 54-58.

2

Ibid, p. 77.
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Every mtion in the war tried to procure the friendship and, if possible, the cooperation of the United States. But
Great Britain, worldly wise from the experiences gained through
the governing and controlling of her great empire, had an early
start in the atte __ :pt to mould the a..'Uerican mind. Ina sense this
headstart was not brought about by direct propaganda but by
friendly incidents in international relations. One inciCtent involved the Venezuela boundary dispute in 1896 which threatened
war between the two English speaking nations in the application
of the I1onroe Doctrine.

~7hen

the act ion became pub lia, prominent

men in both countries threw their weight to the side of conciliation. Joseph Chamberlain, an influential member of the cabinet,
expressed official Dritish opinion when he declared in a speech
in Dirmingham in January, 1896, "We do not oovet one single
inch of .American territory. 'iJar between the two nations would be
an absurdity as well as a crime. I should look forward with
pleasure to the possibili ty of the Stars and Stripes ana. the
Union Jack floating t'ogether in defense of a common cause san1

ctioned by humanity and justice."
Further cementing of

Anglo-A~erican

friendship was

fostered by an incident at the Battle of ilanil, Bay, when the
1

Bemis, daIlluel Flagg: A Diplomatic History of the United States,
po 421.
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British fleet (as the newspapers reported it) checked a possible
1
GerUE.n intervent ion. ( This story was much exaggerated, but had
influence.) At any rate, British diplomacy favored American
policy during the 8panish dar and after.
Since the turn of the century america had been favored
with a stream of anti-German propaganCia from "-reat Britain. Since
Ac.uerican newspapers rarely rraintdined correspondents on the
continent their

for~igh

news came by way of London, where it was

highly colored by the anti-German policies of The Times and other
British newspapers, most of it emanating from newspapers owned
2
or controlled by Lord Northcliffe.
This headstart of fifteen years in the battle of propaganda stood G-reat 3ritian in good stead. Their imtnediate problem at the outset of war was to ass ure thems-el ves of the support
of the leaders of Ame r ican life, and in this regard they were
1

Ehodes, JaJa:3s ]j'ord: History of the United ;3tates, Vol. 9, p. 160.
2

Lora Nor'thclifie, (1865-1922) in 1908 obtained control of th.e
ilimes, to ovm willch had alwe.ys be,n one of the aims of his life.
From 1900 onwards, through his news Da-oers, he had exercised an
ever-increasing influence on politics • .ue bad at one time been
anxious, like ~dward VII, and 0ec il Rhodes, to obtain a friendly
understand ing between. :3ngland and Germany, but G-er,,1 an policy
during the Boer war caused him to abandon the idea~as impracticable. His newspapers consistently pleaded the cause of a
strong navy, and as consistently warned the nation for 20 years
of the peril from Ger:~-any. i:'rom 1902 he sought to effect an
entente ~.ith li'rance, and also to promote agree::1ents wi th Russia
and the United i3tates, whose sentiments and prejudices he had
learnt in many vi si ts. Before ·the Uni ted ,;jta tes entered the war
he was offered and declined the post of British Ambassador at
.iashingt on. He also owned the Exnress and the Daily l,lail.
The Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th Ed. Vol. 16, p. 526.
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fortuna te. The American aris t ocra twas dist inctly Anglophile. To
assume a pro-Bri tish atti tude was the "thing to do" among cultured Americans. This was accentuated by the fact that the economic aristocracy did most of its foreign business

thro~gh

Lon-

1

don.

One of the 1,Io:c gan pa. rtners t Thomas Lamont, sta ted ~ "Like

most of our contemporaries and friends and neighbors we

(4.

p.

l'iforgan and Company) wanted th e allies to win the war from the
2

outset. de were pro-Ally by inheritance, by instinct, by opinion."
At tm beginning

o~

the struggle to control opinion

Gerrrany possessed one advantage. Next to the iiri tish Isle St Germany had

rIB

de the 1a rgest co ntri but ion to the .Ameri can popula-

tion. The greater number of

German-Ar~ricans

were of the second

or third generation, men whose fathers or grandfathers had entered the co untry between the fo rti as and the nine ties of the last
century and were now assimilated. after the United States entered
the war they were patriotic, with only a small minority being
traitorous

t

but previously they voiced pro-German opinions. Also

unfriendly to the Allies were the Jews who had been persecuted
by the RUSSians,

~ngland's

Ally, and the Irish who could never
3
forgive the British Empire for its sub,jection of I:beland. The

1
Peterson,

Ope

cit., p. 8.

2

Time Magazine, Vol. XXVII, NO.3 (Jan. 20, 1936) p. 16.
3

l1illis, '.Ialter: The hoad to riar, p. 6.
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Germans had conducted a form of propaganda, starting in 1902
when the Kaiser's bI'other, Prince lienry, visited Alllerica. A
museum of >Jerman culture was establi;shed at Harvard; an exchange
professor was sent to Columbia; a number of prominent

.i~'nericans

were given honorific ribbons tow ear, but such feeble efforts
made little headway against the British, and in 1914 American
publicists wi th any views a t all on foreign affaL's were apt to
1

be rather pro-British and anti-German.
ldany prominent \.;ferm.ans were aware 0:Z the task that
faced the

~tatherland

without a st upend.ous propaganda campaign

to counteract the flow of British words. One of these men was
Dr. Ernest Daenell, a uerman University professor.
tlilothing has occu:r'red in the past which
America can charge against us, yet there is
one tremendous obstacle, between America
and l7e rmany •
"~Ye must overcome the peculiar historioal feeling existing betwen america and
England; for those Arooricans who are responsible for arreri can Dolitics and for the shaping of public opinion are of Anglo-Saxon
extraction." 2
From the very beginning of the war,

"'~ermany,

like all

of the warring nations, conducted a ca::npaign of patriotic propaganda at home to keep up the morale o'f the GeruRIl people and
the troops. This work had been put into the hands of the "](riegs-

1
The Literary Digest, Vol. XLIX; No. 21 (Nov. 21, 1914) p. 1010.
2

;Jwain, Joseph iVard: Beginning the Twentieth Century, p. 474.
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presseamt", which had also the task of issuing the war news to
the German press. 'l'his double duty resulted in a failure to organize an effective propaganda systeel in the.:h'atherland, since
the "Kriegspresseamt If c oncent ra. ted its efforts mainly on the
1

war news.
The first move in the war of words occurred on August
5. 1914, when the .ari tish cut the cables between

~errilany

and

the United 3tates, leaving the German government with wireless
telegraphy as their only direct means of access to the American
2
pub11c. The second mOve was the cens orship of the ·press of
Eng land, and although directed a2~ainst subversive activities

throughout the Empire, indirectly affected .L1.iller1can opinion
as Amer ican ne ws ci ispa tuhes. handled by London

newspaper~

came

3

under this censorship.
The third move was the censorship of outgoing mail
and cables to control information passing between Ear ope and
America. dchreiner

0=

the Associated Press estirm ted that at

this time (1915) nearly three-quarters of the dispatches written
by American correspondents in Central Zurope were perishing
4

under the shears of the British censors.
1

Bruntz. George G.: Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the
German Empire in 1918. p. 194.
2

Peterson, Ope cit •• pp. 4-12.
3

Ibid., p. 13.
4

Ibid., p. 16; see also 1.1:1llis, OPe cit., p. 147.
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'llhe first organization for the dissemination of British
propaganda was a Neutra.l Countries 3uboommi ttee, whioh, though
begun on a private basis in August 1914, was takenovor by the
government's Central Committee (Central Committee' for National
Pa t;riotio Organizati ons) the following month. The method of the
subcom:J.i ttee was as fa:c as possi ble one of direct personal
approach. IJaterial was sent out, not in the name of the ·committee,
but in the name of various distinguished

~litishers,

wnose ao-

quaintances, colleagues ,. fell.ow worker3, or or:siness associates
in ne utral lands recei ved-- of tent lmes unwi llingly-- propaganda
material prepared and sent by the committee. By this means every
possible variety of interests in the neutral countries was reached. dome 250,000 pamphlets, booklets and other publioations
were thus distributed between august 1914 and January 1, 1916.
The first official propaganda organization in England for activi ty elsewhere was the dar Propaganda Bureau,
the l!'oreign office in the la.tter p:1rt of

1~14.

estE~blished

by

It concerned it-

self with the distribution of leaflets, painphlets and other
material in Allied and neutral countries. This official organization was nothing more than the .Neutral Countries Subcommittee
under ot'ficial government sanction and control. The di rector of
the bureau was the :cit. Hon. C. 11\ :Iastennan, and its headquarters
were at 'Nellington House, the office

0.'

the National Health

Ins urance Company. The ex is tence of this cO;'l1mit tee was unl::nown
to the general publio, as it was thought best to attach as little
publicity as possible to its operations at home and in Allied
-26-

1

and neutral co unt r Les.
One distinguished English

e~cpert

in this field wrot e.

"Better than any pumped-in propaganda abroad was the method of
making the leaders of the Imperial, neutral or Allied pre38 themselves the propagandists when they retul'ned home." Not bribery
2

but direct pel's onal approach'.

In 2ne'land, !fArner .Lcan journal ists,

publicists, authors, statesmen, greete:cs, and munition-malmrs"
were courted assidueusly. "Clubs were open to them an] tea.3 and
dinners were given for them. rhe AdericaTJ. wives of inglishmen,
led by Lady Astor, formed a batt",:lion of solici tude lest ALrer3

icans in London became homes iok ."

These na ti ve Ame ri can prop-

aeandists were volunteers, some being indi viJually enli sted in
'Ol:1e

case~3,

but in the main they were regimented into "soldiers

of the king" by a process of elimina.ting, or at least curtailing,
enemy interpretations 0:::' the war and by dominating the news with
exaggerated and warped pro-ally accounts of what was happening
or had happened. Once these Arnet'icans had acquired the Ifcorrectl1
frame of mind, they were ffenlisted" for the "duration of the 1iJar."
The formal propaganda groups acted

Ii£)

rely as connecting and re-

inforcing elements of the .ori tish propaganda organizations. The

1
Bruntz, Ope cit., pp. 19-21.
2

Peterson, Ope cIt., p. 25 (Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and
the Press, London, 1927, p. 12)0
3

Ibi d•., p. 27 (Palmer, .lPrederi ck, dith idY Own Eyes, p. 332).
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\

real propagandists were the A:.ae ricans -- our preachers, teachers,
1

poli t icians and Journalists.
The first step in direct action propaganda or censorship to directly effect America

occm~red

jU8t six months before

america entered the war, wh en too few re:.1&ining cables were
closed to the Hearst newspaper syndicate and their correspondents
expelled. This ID9ant that all newsapers receiving their foreign
news from t he In terna ti om 1 News ;;3ervice would ha ve to c onfor m
to censorsnip or seek a new source of news. Hearst I s London
representative was instructed to tell him that the prohibition
would be effective at once unless Hearst would give his personal
assurance that all dispatches would be printed exactly as received
after passage through the British censorship.iihen. he heard the
news Hearst said, flI am going to tell them to go to hell," whereupon the British made good their threat, giving as official
gro unds "the continued garbling of messages and b l'each of faith
on the part 0:' the Ihternati onal News 3ervi ce. 11 Hearst res orted
2

to the pirating of news from a rival press association.
From the partial studies which have been made of German propaganda one thing stands out olearly; it suffered from
military control.and ineffective organization. Professor :aanse,
the nazi military specialist, attributes the superiority of

1
Ibid., p. 32.
2

Riegel, Osoar

Mob ilizing for Ohaos, p. 25.

-28-

English'propaganda to the fact that it was run by civilians, the
German by soldiers. "The latter is the wrong way, because it is
not the sOldier's but the psychologists' opinion that counts
1

here."

,H. D. Lasswell contrasts the strong coordina t ion of the

British propaganda system in the United 3tates with the minimum
of coordinated propaganda effort in Gerillany, where each department
went ahead 4ln its own way, and the only formal cooperation was
2
in the press conference, which met two or three times a week.
Others do not 'agree that the, German propaganda machine was dei

fective. 3idney .2ogerson maintains that "in 1914 Germany was the
only power in Europe which had deliberately built up a national
propaganda system. She had been at p:::ins to ens ~e that news
favorable to Germany was disseminated in as thoro ughly organized
a manner as she had organized her army, her navy, and her industry. f1 Will Irwin hold s much the same opinion, that German prop3

aganda had the advantage in the ea:cly days of the war.
But if one is to follow t~~ugh on the splendid organization of German ina. u;3try and military power, we shall discover
that this very idea, organization, was skillfully used by British
propagandists to undermine american opinion of Germany by making
efficiency and organization synonymous with regimentation and
1

Read,

Ope

cit., p. 104.

2

Lasswell,

Ope

cit., p. 22.

Read,

cit., p. 105.

3
Ope
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autocracy and in conflict with the

~rican

ideal of' freedom.

John Cowper Powys, staff lecturer on Literature for Oxford Univ1

ersity Bxtension Delegacy, in his reply to Professor =Junsterberg's
writings on

Ger~an

culture, used emotional language to undermine

this .American opinion of German

organiz~',tion.

"Let Americans who waver in their
allegiance to the cause of the future of
the human spirit because of Junsterberg's
talk by 'Cossacks. and their Progroms'
and English and Prench with their 'colored
races' think of the growth of their own
republic. Let them tnink of' those great
principles of indi vidual liberty, as against all government-machines, upon which
the American ideal is based. Letthem think
of Jefferson and of Emerson, of .l1'ranklin and
of Walt ;ihitman; and let them decide whether they prefer to live in a world dominated by over-drilled and over-bearing
'efficiency.' or in a world of free, instinctive beauty, and free, instinctive
faith!" 2
The Germans, according to the admission of numerous
authorities, like George Sylvester Viereck, editor of The Fatherland, were most inept at propaganda •. ,b'urther evidence of inefficiency is given by Count Von Bernstorff, Gennan ambassador to the
1

Hugo .L,iunsterberg was a Ger;l1an-.A.raerican psychologist and philOSopher. He was in charge of the psychological laboratory at Harvard fro3 1892-1895. A few years later he became the head of the
department of Philosophy at Harvard. He was the exchange professor from Harvard at the University of Berlin in 1910-1911. Became professor of Philosophy of RAdcliffe College in 1916. One
of the leading German sympathizers in America.
2

Powys, John Cowper: The Nar and Culture, p. 79.
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.

·!

~

United States, Count Czerin, the austrian :.anister of Foreign
Affairs during a part of the war and Kaiser Wilhelm himself. Those
ohiefly responsible for disseminating the doctrines of the Central
powers in

~nerice

were Dr. Bernhard Dernberg, formerly Secretary

of dtate for the Colonies, who came officially as the representative of the,Red Cross, and Dr. Heinrich albert, attached to the
Embassy as

Co~ercial

Attache. George

~ylvester

Viereok, as editor

of i'he Fatherland, was already at If:.Ork before the German propaganda machine oommenoed

oper~tions

through the establishment of

the \.ierman Infm"'Llation Bureau in 1915. With the help of various
Germans, ne ws releases were sent out to over 500 papers.
In Deoember, 1914, Dr. Willia,:J. 3ayard Hale, a former
clergyman, who had been a jourlJalist for many years as the literary edl tor of the li"ew York Times and editor of the ""arId r s
Work, was e".lployed to prepare pro paganaa Ii terJ.. t ure • .cie was a
1

close friend of ./oodrow ',/ilson.

This burea.u, which never had

more than a dozen men in it, took care of the ordinary work of a
propaganda organization. It published pamphlets, gave favorable
support to authors desiring to publish books whioh were favorable
to Germany, and later arranged for the release of some newsreels.
It was realized,

0

f course, the. t the newspaoer was the most effeo-

tive propaganda medium tn the United .3tates. Consequently, muoh
attention was given to tht:: problem of creating a more sJrnpathetic
1

Abrams, ..::\ay H.: Preachers PreiJent ..d.rms, p. 19.
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attitude in the press. The Gerrmns were anpalled by the attitude
of

~eric2.n

newspapers'. The few friendly statements vJhich vvere

pub lished were nat urally unh.liJOrtant in comparison with the flood
1
of arti cles wh ich r~ere unfrienctly. Pro-German co lU,;lllS r,ere conducted by H. L.

LIenc~;:en,

in the Jal timore Jun, and by Edmund von

:,Iach in the Boston:l'ralls Ci: ipt.

Pirst published in August, 1914,
2
rhe .1!'atherland was undiluted pro-Germanism. 3ut these were drops
in an ooean of pro-ally propaganda.
Gerrran propaganda addressed i t::Jelf primarily. to gro ups
from whioh it could expect a sympathetic response. It sought the
old -fashioned American with .ii-eva lutiol1ary tradi t ions; the cotto.n
grower ot' the .south, alma t bankrupted by the blockade; the Irish
with a grudge against

~ngland;

the Jew with a grudge against

I,ussia; ana. last, not least, the German-American. The isolationists whose world ends with the ROCk(y

~.Iountains

lent a willing ear

to the voice of the propagandists. The pacifists, except for those
who regarded the Allied enterprise as a "war to end war,n clasped
hancis with the pro-Germans to prevent Uncle Sam from increasing
the ranks of the be llige _'ents. The radi cals co ope rc.:i. ted for reasons of their own. Pacifism was the motive of some resentment
against the capitalistic groups, the banks which loaned money to
the Allies, and the munition makers whose war babies were skyrocketing in the stock ma.rket, infl uenced others; sti 11 othe rs
1

Peters on,

Ope

cit., p. 137.

B

Viereck, George dylvester: Spreading Germs of Hate, p. 49.
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....

1

were deliberately seduced by bribes.

at one time German propa-

gandists in . a.merica agreed on a mailing list composed of all
those listed in M'rillo I s '.1ho in .ameri ca fl in addi tion to all members
of Congress ani the state legislatures, but this was not carried
2

out.

Later, in order to reach the intelligentsia, especially

those .....rooricans who had studied at German Universities, the Germans sapDorted a new organization known as the University League.
3

The aim of the University League was to be a na.cleus of Kultur.
The German

propagan~ists

bad the cooperation of the

Gernan-American .ti.lliance, which was well organized in the

lt er -

man st:..' ongholds over the na ti on: St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati.
and

~iIilwaukee.

There were numerous

~erman

social clubs and

societies. The Kriegsbund was com(losed of those who had se:cved
in the German army. rhere were several veterans Dosts of the
war of lB70. The Geneva Society was a specialized organization
of German wai terse The Turner Societ ies and a 11 sorts of benevolent organizations were thriving in every Genlan district.
The Lutheran Church was a strong asset of the Gerrrans, for
there were 6,000 congregations in the United States, whose
4

communicants numbered some three million. 'rhe American Truth
1

Ibid" p. 46.
2

Ibid" p. 57.
3

Ib id" p. 94.
4

Lasswell,

Ope

cit., p. 150.
-33-

Sooiety, headed by

~"~.

Jeremiah O'Leary, poured forth Germn

propaganda under see~lingly dorrestio ausnioes. The .tUnerioan
Humanity League, the .Amerioan Independenoe :Inion, and many
other devotedly paoifisti 0 organizati ons of dubious parentage
were very aoti ve. On June 19, 1916, th ey he ld a great mss
meeting in New York wi th 1fr • .Bryan as prinoipal speaker, and
with

i~epresentative

Frank Buohanan, member of the House Com-

mittee on naval Affairs, as another, and with diplonatio representatives of the Central Powers on the platform inoluding
: 1

Captains Boy-Ed and. Von Papen,
~

who were lferrnan propagandists.

vast throng appeared and extra speakers harangued the over-

flow in the streets. Yet it did not help the emba"rgo movementl
and had anyone learned that it was Ca.ntains

Bo~,'-Ed

and Von Papen
2
who supplied the funds, it would probably have destroyed it.
The British propaganda on the conduot of the war was

mostly based upon the appalling politioal stupidities oommitted
by the Gernans. Starting with the invasion of Belgium and ending
with the

Zi~wrman

note, the Germans oommitted a series of

politioal blunders which were simply incomparable. new to the
field of world power they had little appreciation of the faot
that their aots had to be justified by something besides exped1

Franz Von Papen, later German Chanoellor and diplomat under
Hi tIe r, ao "'. ui tted at Nuremb Ul'g trials, 1947.
2

Millis, Ope oit., p. 203.
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iency. In the G-erfJan attempt to sway .tUlleric'ln opinion they
were hampered by their ignorance of ..1.,'llerican Dsychology. J:1his
rather than

.:31~i ti

sh cleverne ss swayed the balance of power

towards the side of the allies in the moldine of .dJIlerican opinion. Dy judicious editing and rather Jpecialized emphaSis these
German errors were turned into veritable acts of frightfulness.
'l'he emphasis on the fearful plights of flwomen and children"
characterized ail Dr iti sh propaganda, but Jellingto n

hOUS e

rea-

lized that this procedure could reach perfection only if it were
made less abstract. The outstanding exar;ple of this type work
1
was the Report of the 00rnmittee on Alleged Ger~an Outrages Which
dealt vdth the Belgian atrocities. Due to the length of the original report it was later condensed into eaSier reading and in
order that "mankind" might have access to it, it was put on sale
at the nominal price of one penny. The tragedy of Edith Cavell,
when gi ven artistic treatment, came to be the second ranking

1
James 3ryce, 1st. Viscount .dryce (1838-1922), English statesman,
jurist and author, was chairman of the Dritish commission to
study the st aries of German outrages in .delgi urn and France .rhe
character 01' the rep ort of the c ommissi on (hereinafter referred
to as the Bryce Report) helps to explain how inaccuracies and
exaggerations so frequently crept into the text. Report itself
was a bookl0t of 60 pages, the .d.ppendix containing the proofs
ran to 300 pages. Some 500 depositions were appended to the
report, a selection from a total collection of 1,200. :,Iost of
the d ep osi ti ons were mad'e by 3elgian refugees in England, some
from .d.llied soldiers and a small number were excerpts from the
diaries of Gerrmn soldiers. actually not one cleal'-cut case, of
confessed "atrociousness" was in an.v of them, although many tell
of the execution of alleged franc tireurs and more, of plunderings. Read, OPe cit., p. 204.
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1
atrocity story of the war.
:rhe German

submal~ine

warfare also brought the war home

to .tWlerica and. made it possible fo:t the Allies to claim that
tnis was proof to substantiate their other claims of German
barbar ity. In sp it e of all illi t iga ti r:g factor.:'.
the Lusi tania

the s iniring, of

was the most damaging of all the polit ical errors

made by the .xerlllans dur ing the war. It was disastro us to Germany
~-jas

bec&.use it

a striking and dramatic event. The spectacle of

the innocent passengers .aRtie victims of German :cuthlessness
outweighed any actualities of contricutory responsibility of the
United i3tatea, lireat J3ritian and the Cunard Company, 'or the
dub ious correctness

0

f the

:Jerican policy concerning traveling

.d..

in the wa:c zone. It branded uerulany as the malefactor. The entire
fie Id of H:citish propaganda v,as benefi ttedby this inc icient. ihe
most

mar~ed

advantage was galned with the .ame:cicans '''-liho had been

enlisted or drafted as i3rit ish propagal1uists. :.Llhey saw a C o;-,1p16 te
justification of their attitudes. The edito:cs on the

~itlantic

seaboard lost their heads coapletely and all found it a type of
2
sensation which sold their newspapers for them.
The arrival of the German sub:rE.:tine Deutschland at
Baltlmore in July, 1916, received much attention in the American
1

Peterson,

OPe

cit., p. 51.

2

Ibid.) pp. 109, 125.
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press-- which was we 11 1i vided on the me :cit s of such a mission.
Slipoing through the 131:'i tish blockade, the sUbms. :cine a.nnounced
itself as being here tor the 9ucpose
supplies for
it

v~as

too

o::~

taking on badly needed

German government, but one can also iLlagine that

here for propaganda purp'oses as the pay load of a submarine

is ver:{ little even when comps.red with the smallest freighter.
The :3altimore alIErican believed that the incident was the beginning of "a ne w era in th e wo r Id 's rna rine his tory, If and the Bos ton
Journal declared it Ifman's gr.eatest single vic;;ory over the sea."
Otner newspapers th8.t could see value in the mission included
the new York Globe which stated, "a pioneer, a merchant boat
pure and 'simple," while the Hew Haven Journal-Courier believed
the incident,vould aid the nation in remaining neutral.
6ut ot he r rep resenta t ives of the .tl.ll1er ican p ress felt
differently. "-'.1he Brooklyn Eagle asiced, flzepplins next?" vvhile the
3nringfield Union believed the incident would "avail t.hero little,"
and the New Yor ~ dun considered it of lit t 10 importance. The
Pittsburgh Chronicle-Telegraoh stated ironically, "The Deutschland
wi 11 carry at least 1,400 tons of nickel and rubber for the
starving babies of Germany." The general surlJ!,.'B.ry of the press,
towards the inc ident, pr oved that a slight maj or i ty

0

f Ameri can

papers commenting on the incident, had already made up their mind
1

as to whom they were supporting.

Gerrran propaganda had a huge

1

Lit. Dig. LIII; 4, (July 22, 1916) p. 169.
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obstaole to overoome.
Even the retaliation of the British government, the
blaoklisting of Amerioan firms whioh had

s~pplied

the

De~tschland.

found m~oh support in ·the press. The BrooklYn ~agle remained
oonsistent in its stand, calling the British aotion.
while the Journal of Co.eroB

t

"j~tifiablew

a spokesman for Amerioan moneied

interests, believed that the firms were "run and oontrolled from
Berlin." Fighting for what they oonsidered the law of the sea
and the rights of nations

wer~

the New York Evening Mail whioh

oonsidered the aot ion as "vi olating a fandamental of international law" and the New York World whioh believed that "Britain
was inviting retaliation." The German

lang~age

papers foc.ght the
1

British with a

h~e

flow of words,

to little avail.

b~t

Whether the German government disoovered that their
friendlY visits to Amerioa were not having the desired effeots
and deoided to Change their polioy is
ing of Ootober 9. 1916, the Amerioan

~certain b~t

p~b1io

on the morn-

was amazed to read

that the U-53 oommanded by Captain Hans Rose had penetrated the
waters of Narragansett Bay and had

s~

five ships almost within

sight of the ooast. Two. of the ships belonged to
Holland and Norway. This was the only effort

~t

ne~tral

powers,

Germany to invade

Amerioan waters. If this aot was intended to soare Anerioa ollt
of entering the war, it had bad psyohologioal direotion, for in1

Lit. Dige, LIll; 5

(J~y

29. 1916) p. 235.

stead of keeping .A..!m ri ca ont of the war it proTed to DBny the
1

danger of German seapower.

The New York Evening Post stated,

"in qnarters olose to the Administration the extension of the
German snbmarine oampaign to the Atlantio seaboard of the United
States is regarded as constituting the gravest menace to the
maintenanoe of good relations between the two countries which
has appeared since the sinking of the Lusitania."

2

Not only did the Germans commit political blunders,
they also failed in the first. step of opinion formulation, that
of meeting the .public on the public's level. Ambassador Bernstorff complained of the inadeqaacy of the material sent to Amerioa from Berlin:
"The Press-servioe never sucoeeded
in adapting itself to American requirements.
The SaDe may be said of most of the ~ennan
propaganda whioh reached America in fairly
large qaantities since the third month of
the wart part ly in German and part ly in not
always irreproachable English. This, like
the Press telegrams, showed a complete lack
of understanding of American national psychology. The oatstanding charaoteristic of
the Average American is rather a great,
even though superficial, sentimentality.
There is now news for whioh a way oannot be
guarant*ed through the whole country, if
clothed in sentimental form." 3
Another mistake of the u-erman a uthori tie s was in never
1

2

Allen, George H. and others: T;Qe G,eat Wa1:, Vol. 4, p. 428.
L,t.

3

D~i.,

Lasswell,

LIII, 17 (Ootober 21, 1916) p. 1015.
OPe g~~ ••

1,g§, p. 53).

\

p. 34 ( Bernstorff. M;,t Three

Y~lrs

;l.n

!m~1:-

fl1lly appreoiating the absoll1te neoessity of coa.nter-acting
anti-German feeling in the new world. Propaganda was a.nderestimated too long, the organizations which were handling it were
inadeqllate, and the naterial issued was never sufficient. Upon
his retur.n to

Germa~t

Von Papen reported to General Falkenhayn:

"General, if 1'011 do not succeed in
keeping the United States from joining the
coalition of ollr enemies, 1'011 will lose the
war; on this ppint there oan be absolutely
no doubt. The enormous material and moral
resouroes at the disposal of the United
States are so wholly nnderestimated here that
in my opinion it i8 above all things essen.
tial to enlighten public opinion to an extent quite different from that which has
hitherto been the case." 1
The Berlin al1thorities realized

tn.

problem and attem-

pted to rectify their mistakes. In 1916 a syndicate dominated by
Dr. E. A. RWDely bought the New York

~vening

Mail. Unsl1coessfUl

attempts were also made through 3aml1el Untermeyer to pl1rohase
the New York Sqn. The International, a monthly magazine of literature and comment, was bought in 1915. It, however, turned out
to be an unsatisfactory investment. There is some suspicion that
the Jewish paper, Die Wahrheit was financed with German fUnds.
The most sl1coessful of· the investments was the Fatherland, a
weekly magazine edited by Viereok, but little was achieved by
these efforts. The almost Illl&nimous opposition of the American
2

press could not be overcome.
1

Peterson,

Ope

Cit., p. 124.

2
~"P.

139; for further information, see, Pearson, Drew:
Washington Merry-Go-Rognd, June 12, 1948, The Clarksburg l!lL&!:y, Clarksburg, West Virginia, p. 7.
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Ba.t despite their bad start, the German allthoritie's did
learn one lesson-- by 1916 there were few political blunders. The
British also fOllnd it impossible to arollSe any new indignation
over German activities in the United States, since the propaganda
and sabotage work of the latter had been practically eliminated.
The Germans also took advantage of a new method of transmission,
the radio, and sent fllll reports of .A.nsrican correspondents in
1
Berlin and on the German fronts.
The Germans on the field of battle "were also beginning
to sa.pply counter-propaganda by stopping the Allied victory drive
which had been foretold with reams of words. The best the Bri ti sh
2
could now do was to boast that the Germans had not defeated them.
The first big German campaign in America was to defeat
the initial loan to the Allies and the pro-Germans adopted the
pictllresqlle device of having sandWich men parade in'tront of Mr.
Morgan's office, warning against the loan. German-Americans
threatened to boycott banks and insurance companies investing in
the anglo-French loan. In several ci ties, especially Milwallkee,
this agitation, aided by the

~ational

German-American Alliance,

by the American Trllth SOCiety and others, seriollsly interfered with
i

the handling of the bonds. However, the very fact that the proGermans took such an active part in the campaign against the loan
1

Seymour, charles: WOOdrow Wilson and the World War, p. 160.
2

Peterson, Ope Cit., p. 242.
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1

intensified the aotivites of the pro-Allies in its favor.
An attempt to influenoe Congressional aotion involved

the program of the Embargo Conferenoe whioh was organized by the
German propagania bureau to bring a halt to the shipping of munitions. About 250,000 messages were sent to Congress and J. J.
Tobias, of the Friends of

Peaoe~

a kindred organization, empha-

Sized this threat by stating publioly that five million Teutonio
voters were going to "rai se hell n with any party not in favor of
this proposed embargo.

2

One of the most subtle forms of propaganda and also a
new idea in propaganda was the use of motion piotures among foreign-born munition workers. The pioture financed by the AustroHungarian government showed Austro-Hungarian workmen making shells
whioh might kill their relatives on the other side of the ocean.
In one soene the munition faotory burns down. The fire is attributed to a rival manufacturer, but the suggestion is obviOUS. However, no sentimental appeal oould compete suooessfully wi th high
wages.

3

The Germans, first to os e a troo ity stories, failed to
4

propagate

snooessfully.

tl~m

The German authroities were qniok to

1

Viereok,

Ope

git., pp. 30-31.

2

3

4

~"

pp. 100-101.

Ibid" p. 103.
Bead,

OPe

.

oit., p. 73.
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pnblish official reports establishing the "faots" of atrooities
and tmdonbtedly convinoed the German people, bnt they conld not
keep paoe with the Allies in the battle for pnblic opinion thronghont the world. A major weakness in their tactics was the exoessive
time and energy they nsed in defending themselves against Allied
. atrocity oharges; if the items on defense of atrocities in the
German press were weighed against those on charges of atrocities.
the former would probably predominate. The Allies, on the other
hand, paid little if any attention to the German charges. Another
weakness of German propaganda lay in the work of the offioial
agencies. Atrocity reports were pnblished by governmental departments and lacked the prestige aoorning to the reports of
Bryoe in England or of the appointed commissions in France and
Belgium, on whioh noted jnrists and professors served. A third
failing of the German atrocity propaganda was the absence of
pamphlets and artioles detailing the enemy crimes. The official
reports were all large and unwieldy, completely unfitted for popnlar distribution and consumption. A fonrth defect was the failnre
to translate them into the English langnage. Some of this was done.
bntvery little compared with the flood of German atrocities released by the Allies. Of co nrse the a troo ity propaganda suffered,
like all German propaganda, from the Allied control of the oables
and news channels thronghont most of the world. Still, muop more
oonld have been done in the

ciron~tion

of pamphlets and brochures.

The German propaganda bureau did make one strong appeal
to the American pnblio which had favorable results. This was the
-43-

German disoussion of British interferenoe with Amerioan trade and
mails. It was suooessful beoause it dealt with sometbing of importanoe to 'the United States. Thus for onoe the Germans utilized
the British praotioe of dwelling on oommunity of interests, and
for a moment oonvinoed the Amerioan people that their desires were
identioal with those of Germany. The only other really suooessful
German propaganda was that direoted against the export of munitions. This was kept up over a oonsiderable length of time'and
I,

Amerioans agreed that the mnn.itions trade was not righteous. The
Germans failed to talk of sensations. They philosophized and ex1

peoted the people to listen to reason.
The work of the German propaganda b llTeau was also bampered by offioial United States government representatives, with
the stealing of Dr. Albert's portfolio in July, 1915, the prime
exarnple. The Amerioan explanation of the mystery of the pur 10ined
portfolio is furnished by W. H. Houghton of the United States
Seoret Servioe, in the Saturday Evening Post. An agent named
Frank Burke was shadowing Dr. Albert on arders, saw him leave the
portfolio and immediately pioked it up. Whatever the faots in the
portfolio mystery were. the Albert brief oase was immediately
t llTned over to President Wilson. The President entrusted the
hornet's nest to Colonel House and photostatio oopies found their
way into the offioe of the New York World. The pub1ioation of the
Albert papers was a German oatastrophe. It dramatized German
1

Peterson,

Ope

oit., pp. 141-142.
-44-

propaganda. Henoeforth the Allied propagandists oonld go as far
as they liked. The stamp of pro pagandawas fastened npon the
Germans.

1

Other governmental interferenoe was the tapping of tel·
ephone lines from the Gennan embassy and the reoording of every
telephone IEssage from the German embassy to the ontside world.
The oonversations between Embassy offioials and their friends in
New York were spioed with nnoomplimentary referenoes to high per·
2

sonages in the White Honse and the State Department.
German aotivities in tbe United States were in thaa·
selves of no great importanoe in acoomplishing the objeotives for
whioh they had been designed. The propaganda oonvinoed few people
who were not already adherents of the German canse; pnrchases
were too small to make any great differenoe to the 8ool1om10 ......
fare of the Central Powers; the sabotage only delayed-- it did
not stop the snpplying of war materials to the Allies. These
German operations were of oonseqnenoe in that they gave British
propagandists horrible examples in Amerioa whioh served to illnstrate dramatioally that the Germans were Amerioa's enemies and
\

they were as evil as they had been

p~otured.

The trne signifioanoe

of the German aotivities in the history of this period lies in
the faot that the pnblioity given to them augmented greatly the
1

Viereok ..

OPe

oit., pp. 69-70.

2

Ibid" p. 109.
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1
anti-German feeling among the Amerioan people.

Satfioe it to say

that the Amerioan people got the idea that the GermA,n people and
the German government were two separate things, and that the
German government was a menaoe to the world. The German propaganda, none too well reoeived at first, was ruined further in its
effeotiveness by the sinking of the Lusitania. Minor misfortunes
rooked the boat, but did not destroy it. The

Germ~n prop~g~nd~

oraft was wreoked by German torpedoes. Whenever the propagandists
had suooeeded in inveigling

~ublio

,

opinion against Allied aggres-

Bions, bang! -- another Amerioan ship would be blown up by a
Po

submarine.

The New Republic oarried this idea to the extreme

when it stated, " •••• the German government oannot and does not
3

oare to understand the demooratio view of the war."

The finish-

ing orash oame with the exposure of the Zimmerman note-- "We
oannot~"

said Viereok, "remain the friends of a oountry that is
4

plotting to destory our own."
In the House of Commons twenty years after the war .some .
straightforward oomments on British propaganda were delivered by

Mr. Harold Nioolson, ex-diplomat:

"

" •••• I·do not want to be seltrighteous, beoause in a national emer1
Peterson,

Opt

oit., p. 151.

2

3

Viereok, OR. 9it., p. 59.
.

BA.ker, R~ Stannard: Woodrow Wilson Life ~ Letters, Vol. 6,
p. 410 (Ne. Republio, Deo. 30, 1916, p. 226).
4

Viereok,

OPe

oit., p. 114.

genoy we can be as ~truthful as, or
more nntrllthfnl than, anybody else.
Dnring the war we lied damnably. Let
us be olear about that. (An Honorable
Kember: Splendidly?) No, damnably, not
splendidly. I think sane of our lies
have done us tremendous mrm and I
should not myself like to see suah
propaganda again." 1
Muoh of the British atrocity propaganda was deliberate deoeption built upon erroneona reports and misleading impressions. The facts were frequently anestionable, the interpretations misleading. and it wB:s this kind of propaganda that Mr.
Nicolson deplored. Nevertheless milch of it was spread by people
who sincerely believed what they were saying; their faith only
2

added potency to the propaganda.

The best British propaganda

was truth-- not necessarily the whole truth.
The British propagandists in carrying out their work
followed certain general lines which might be called techniques.
In part they were as follows; 1. They told only that part of the
truth which benefitted their cause; 2. They utilized
material

t~

backgro~d

imply things for which there was no evidence; 3. They

exploited to the fnllest the emotions and ideals of those being
educated; 4. They gave· their propaganda an aura of authority by
using big names, by quoting their enemy, or by appealing to legality: 5. They made the ir arguments simple and eliminated all
1

Read,

Ope

cit •• p. 187.

2

Loo. oi t.
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1

qualifying statements; 6. They used endless repetition.
There were a number of faotors whioh oontributed to the
great suooess of Sir Gilbert Par.ker and his assooiates. In the
first plaoe, there was a pro-British attitude among leading Amerioans at the outbreak of hostilities. Seoondly, their propaganda
was unobtrusive. Viereok quoting a British propagandist stated:
"We spoke your language. Our men merged with the orowd. They
passed as Amerioans. In ever newspaper offioe, in every great industrial oonoern, there were Englishmen whose national origin no
:2
one sppeoted or questioned." In the third plaoe, their prinoipal
ene~

was a new rising nation with all the unpleasant oharaoter-

istios nominally
Finally, the ir

~noountered

00 nt ro 1 0 f

the

in the newly rioh and newly powerful.
0

onven t i onal channa Is

0

f Ameri oan

opinion made it unneoessary for them to oompete on an eqaal foot3
ing with the Germans. Sir Gilbert Parker admitted to the last of
these rea.s ona:
"Among other things, we supplied three
hundred and sixty newspapers in the smaller
states of the United States with an English
newspaper Whioh gave a weekly review and
oomment on the affairs of the war. We established oonneotion with the man in the street
through oinema. piotures of the army and navy,
as well as through interviews, artioles
pamphlets, eto •••• We advised and stimulated
many people to write artioles •••• we had re1

Peterson,

Ope

oit., p. 36.

2

Viereok, QP. oit., p. 122.
3

Peterson,

OPe

oit., p. 33.
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ports from important Americans const~nt
ly, and established association by personal correap ondence with inflnential
~:md eminent people of every profession
in the United States." 1
"Practically since the day war broke ont," was Sir
Gilbert's cheerfnl remark, "I was responsible for American pub2

lioity."
The

Allied~opaganda, moreover~ enjoyed the inesti-

mable advantage of heing self-financing. Our publio clamored for
the books, artioles and

moti~n-pictures

films which oonveyed it.

Old established .American puhlishing houses found it profitable,
and did not think it unpatriotio, to enter into agreements with
the Entente governments for the distribution of propagandist
war books, and there was a huge trade in volumes on trench life
from the French and British standpoint. Those who voioed the
German side of the oase found no such markets. The German representatives in the United States had to give finanoial assistanoe
to their outlets.

3

One of the lessons to be drawn from the sucoess of
Brit is h pr opaganda in the United States is t he importance of perl

Slosson, Preston William: A History of Amerioan Life, Vol. XII
"The Great Crusade and After, 1914-1928", p. 9, (Sir Gilbert
Parker: The Untted States and War. Harper's Magazine. CXXXVI
C1918), p. 662 •

2

Millis, OPe cit •• p. 63.
3

Ib id., p. 202.
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sons as means of carrying suggestion. The powers behind the impersonal agencies must be reached, and this is best managed by
1

pers ona1 contact.
The most nearly perfect example of the British propaganda bnreao. taking advantage of sensations ·to attract the attention of the Amerioan po.b1ic, concerned the famous Bryoe report.
Perhaps it was only a ooinoident that on the same day that the
.Amerioan po.blio was notified of the sinking of the Lo.si tania.
when the boiling indignation against Germany was at its height.
that this report was dropped into the maelstrom. The Belgian
atrocities, if not preoise1y forgotten, had been sinking into
the baokgronnd under the weight of an aoou.mnlating skeptioism.
The whole thing had been rather overdone. Bu.t with the Bryoe report, pnblished at ju.st that emotional moment, every dou.bt was
obliterated. There was no name in England whioh conld have inspired more oonfidenoe in an Amerioan pnblio that that of Lord
Bryoe; his six oolleagues were only less impressive. "Proof,"
2

oried the New York Times, "now oanes to hand."

Th~ YeA.sons for the effeoti veness of the Allied propaganda may be snmmed u.p. in the words of an impartial historian,
Carlton J. H. Hayes:
"Entente propaganda in the United
1

Lasswell,

Ope

oit., pp. 212-213.

2

](i11is, JUtL0it., p. 183.
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Sta tes was even more general than that
of the Teutons; it was also more adroit,
more sympathetic, and more conformable
1
to American prejlldloes and Amerioan wishes."

-0-

1

Abrams, OPt oit., p. 19.
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III. THE REACTION OF THE AMERICAN PRESS.

~ newspaper is a private enterprise, owing nothing to the pnblio, Which grants it no franchise.
It is, therefore, "affected" with
no pnblio interest. It is emphatically the property of its owner
who is selling a mannfactured prodnct at his own risk.

Wall Street Journal

The newspaper field must not be overlooked in attempting to sift out the co urse of pllblic opinion during the period
of ollr nelltrality, prior to the entrance of the United States
into the First World War. During this period the daily journals
comprised approximately ninety per oent of the reading material
of the Amerioan public and, although we have no hard and fast
proof for the belief, we feel that they were bound to have influenoed the forming of many

~pinions.

To the everyday reader,

interested in the nation's welfare, the newspaper provided the
. S

~

doings and say""of the world.,and the people as a mOler might
have said;fwith a famous American, "All I know is what I read
in the newspapers."
Training in how to read the newspapers, knowing what
diffioulties in their compilation to allOW for, detecting prejudioe,sllpplementing daily news in the longer disollssions to Qe
found in magazines, are all part of the foundation of intelligent
oitizenship. The newspaper has its own task and funotion. There
is no jastification in making it, as it were, the scapegoat for
failures of the community

~onscienoe.

Yet newspapers are power-

ful weapons. Individual papers have been important if not the
deoisive influenee on di fferent ocoasions in act ually bringing
abollt a war and in preventing wars.
1

1

Libby, C. F. : The Press and World Peace, (The Causes of War),
p. 182.
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All the reporters in the world working all the hours
of the day co uld not wi tne ss all the happenings in the wo rld.
Newspapers do not try to keep an eye on all mankind-- just
certain spots. This makes the press agent or pUblicity man a
valuable person who oan present-these spots in the most favorable or unfavorable light. ThllS every organization with a desire
to express an opinion beoomes a wedge in plaoing its story in
the paper.

1

Newspapermen have a feeling for words and moods

and they know tha. t the pllb lio: is not convinoed by logio. but
2

seduced by stories.
The swift interohange of threats among the Great
Powers in the last week of July and the outbreak of hostilities
in August brought the European orisis to the AImrioan front
page. The .Nel York Times in partiolllar distinguished itself
by printing in full the offioial British oorrespondenoe)rnnning
to more than a hundred documents, as soon as the British government made it available. From the outbreak of the war until the
entranoe of the United States made neoessary a sort of military
censorship, the Amerioan press continuously laid before its
readers the fullest aco.onnt of ourrent events whioh oould then
1

Lippman.

OPe

Cit., pp. 338, 345. 377.

2

Lasswell,

OPt

cit., p. 32.
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be obtained anywhere in the world.

1

The general reaction of 'the American press to the
European blood-bath was a "Thank God for the Atlantio OoeAn."
The Ohicago Herald proposed a rising vote of thanks to Christopher Columbus. The New York Evening Post poored its oontempt
~pon

the three continental emperors, Franois Joseph of

Austri~

Hungary, Nicholas of RUSSia, and William of Germany-- "one of
them senile, another subject to melancholia, and a third often
showing signs of a disturbed mental balance"-- who had given the
signal for the holooaust. "Oor isolated position and freedom
from entangling alliances," the Literary Digest summed uP.,
"inspire our press with the oheering assurance that we are in
no peril of being drawn into the European quarrel."

2

Amerioan

sympathies were divided, but opinion was united in the belief
that the United States could never be other than a speotator.

As many editors looked

3

upon the situation they began

to visualize incidents that might .ffect them in days to come.
The St. Louis

Rep~blic

stated, "As the shock of the present

experience passes away the oapital of the world Will be invested in suoh quantities'as never before in the industrial and
commeroial enterprises of a oountry 4,000 miles from the orosse~
1

Sloss on,

Ope

cit., p. 3.

2

BAle, William Harlan: The March of Freedom. A Layman's Historr
of the Amerioan Peop.e, p. 207.
3

Seymour, Charles: AmeriQan Diplomaoy Doring the World War. p. 5.
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bayonets of Europe." The He. York COmmergial snrveyed the soene
stating, "If England can keep control of the seas onr trade in
breadstnffs and meats will be enormons and highly profitable,
beoause Russia. the ohief wheat grower of the world, will be
shnt in and the grain orops of the valley

o~

the Dannbe will

be praotioally destroyed." The New York Jonrnal of Commeroe
viewed the Situation differently, feeling that "higher prioes
for clothing beoanse of wool imports sh Ilt off wi 11 be neoessary
and the same for rllbber, odtp1?er and tin," while the

~

bel i eved

that the sllpply of women's fashions from Paris would be shut
1
off.
On

~e

other hand thete was a widespread tendenoy

on the part of the. Amerioan press to hold Gernany and her rnler
largely responsible for the war. The New York Globe believed
that "it is diffionlt to admit that German interests were menaoed beyond reasonable toleranoe •• '•• .Amerioan opinion is almost
solidly arrayed against

Ge~any

as the aggressor, rnthlessly

plnnging Europe into what looks like the bloodiest of wars to
satisfy the overwhelming ambi ti on of the Emperor." Bllt the
Ne. York Herald felt differently, believing that "the Kaiser
np to the very last moment almost went down on his knees to
B

Rnssia to indooe her to desist from mobilization. "
1

LIt. Dig., XLIX. 7 (Aug. 16, 1914) pp. 256-267.

2
~.,

p. 264.

The staid

Times also believed the aonfliat was the "least justified of
all wars sinae man emerged from barbarimn •••• ", seeing the
1

Kaiser as the aggressor.

The Springfield Repnblican bending

baakwards to remain neutral "supposed" a JRrallel to Austria's
case: "Suppose Texas filled with rebellions Mexicans anxiOUS
to seaede to Mexioo, and a President of the United States ~sass2

inated by a Texan affiliated with the Mexiaans."

But the Liter-

ary Digest eXpressed the aommon opinion "that while onr trade
Will be stimulated, we will e,ventually share in the economic
3

loss of such a disaster."
From a survey of the .Amerioan press at the beginning
of hostilities it appeared that, out of a total of 367 editors,
105 admitted favor for the Allies and 20 for the German cause,

the other 242 disavowing any' preferenae. The'feeling of the
oommunities represented was given as pro-Ally in 189 aases,
pro-German in 38, divided in 140. One might also feel that the
editors were no different in ahoosing their favorite than the
members of the aommunity-- only more aautious in expressing an
opinion. The expression of war-time sentiment was partly seotional. In both oases the Middle West was more pro-German than
4

the East, the Far West or the South.
1

2

The evalcation of the

Lit. Dig., XLIX, 6 (Aug. 8, 1914) p. 215.

.

Ibid., p. 216.
3

1.lli.\
!W.,

4

p. 215.
XLIX, 20 (Rov. 14, 1914) p. 939.
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midwest was probably wrong with the pollsters mistaking neutrality for pa.rtisanshlp or taking the isolated instames of
German-American citizens in Chicago and Milwankee as representing the entire seotion. Sharp oomment by eastern newspapers on the "paoifism" of the midwest pr ovoked a corresp onding
sensitivity, an exchange which brought an amusing sequel,
when, after the United States entered the war, western edi tors
could show that recruiting prGceeded most rapidly in the
"paoifist" states.

1

Some persons Ilrged from the start thB.t the oauses of
democracy.ani oivilization were so closely bound up with the
fortunes of the Entente nations that it was the moral duty of
the United States to join these powers in arms. But the country
as a whole saw no possible course save neutrality, a polioy
diotated alike by present interest and by a oentury and a quarter
of consistent praotice. August 4, when five nations had entered
the war, President Wilson issued a formal proolamation of neutrality, which was repeated as successive states entered the contest; and two weeks later he made a special appeal to his fellowo it izena to be "neutral in fact as well as in name.... We must
2

be impartial in thought as well as in aotion •••• "
1
2

Wilson re-

Lit. Dig., LIV, 11 (May 19, 191') p. 1486.
.

Ogg, Frederio Austin: The American Nation: A History, Vol. 27,
National Progress, p. 329.
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r

oQested this "impartiality", fearing hyphenated inflQences when
offioial nelltrality was the obviOQS policy. OQr foreign relations
were based QPon a theory or tradition of isolation, bQt eoonomioally we.were entangled vitally in every part of the world. The
government

00

Qld assert its determined ne Iltrali ty, for it had

little politioally at stake; bQt OOQld Amerioan indllstry and fi1

nance be kept nentral?

The New York TimeS immediately reiterated

the stand taken by t be President stating, "It is a
great oomfort and

satisfaoti~n

S

ouroe of

to feel that in sllCh a time as

this we have a President who knows so well how to do and say the
right thing," Rnd on Ootober 1D they praised him again believing
that President Wilson "has taken the exaot stand and has expres2

sed it with admirable aoouraoy."

Henry Watterson, in his own

mind separating the German people from the German government,
was anything bllt impartial to the government, as he wrote in
the LOQiav1lle COQrier-Jonrnal,

"~

Heaven proteot the Vater-

land from oontamination and give the German people a ohanoe!
3

To Hell with the Hohenzollerns and the HapsbQrga."·
In general, it may be said that throllghoQt the nation
the people listened to Wilson's proclamation of neutrality with
great respect and probably intended to carry it OQt to the letter.
Bllt a sustained neQtrality Qllder the oirollmstances was too muoh
1

Baker,

Opt

2

cite, Vol. 6. pp. 173-174.

Ibid., pp. 96, 162.
3

1Iillis,

OPe

oit., p. 67.
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1

to expeot. "Morally DiHltral the oountry never was," asserted
John Dewey. "and probably the only stupid thing President Wilson
did was to suppose, in his earl¥ proolamation, that it ooo.ld
I

be."

Another minor oritioism of the President oame from the

New York Times. jo.st four days after they had praised his stand.
The staid Times believed that the President's "soh.olarly s arroundings" persuaded him to take "too kindly a view of the good
intentions of foreign nations."

2

With the Ger.man invasion of Belgium the Amerioan press
was saddenly flooded with atrooity stories. An answer to many
of them oame from a group of Amerioan newspapermen in Belgium
who had been overtaken by the

Ge~an

thereafter with the (7erman armies.

advanoe and had oontino.ed

~arly

in September a bundle

of Allied and neo.tral newspapers fell into their hands; they
were astounded and shooked by what they read oonoerning the operations they had jo.st been witnessing. Harry Hansen, Irvin Cobb,
John f. MoCutoheon, Roger Lewis and O'Donnell Bennett dispatohed
a joint cable to the Assooiated Press:
"In spirit fairness we unite in deolaring Gennan atrooities groundless as
far as we were able to observe. After spending two weeks with wernan army aooompany-.
ing troops upward hundred miles we unable
report single instanoe unprovoked reprisal.
1

Abrams, Ope oit., p. 21. (John Dewey, Amerioan philosopher and
eduoator and long-time Columbia University professor.)

2

.

Baker,

Opt

oit., Vol. 5, p. 180.
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f

Also unable oonfina r~mors proved gro~nd
less •••• Disoipline berman soldiers exoellent as oBserved. Io dr~ekness. To
tr~th these statelD3nts we pledge professional personal wo rd. II 1
Moreover, the Amerioan

oons~l-General

at Antwerp

telegraphed the State Department that positively no bodily
harm had come to Belgian women and ohildren in that oi ty,
althongh the preoipitate exeoution of the

exp~lsion

order

might have worked hardships on some of them. "In times like
these, stor.ies of terrible at,rooities will orop

.

where

b~t

let Americans keep

0001

altera DArs." (the other party

and remember

m~t

o~t

every-

a~diat~

et

also be given a hearing.)

The State Department immediately answered Consul General
Diederioh informing him that
an express ion of opinion by
oers."

2

"O~r
o~

ne ~trali ty doe s not permit

diplomat io or oonslllar offi-

This State Department message might have been the ex-

treme form ofne ~trality or the first hint that the Allies
were oar "secret ohampion" in the

~aropean str~gg1e.

Herbert

Hoover, head of the Belgian Relief Commission, summed up the
oase of the Belgian deportations:
It is oar belief that the brutality
of the operation was largely the fault of
the looal commandants and lack of adeqate
arrangeDEnts for the reoeption and distribut ion of the evaoues. We do not believe
any SllO~ brutalities were oommitted with
intent of high allthorities. We believe they
1

MilliS,

OPe

git., p. 68.

2

Read, 9D. oit., p. 45.
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honest 17 and expedi t ioo.s ly corrected the
matter as far as they were able when it
oame to their attent ion, and we are informed that disoiplinary measures were taken.
We do not believe the stories of rape, or
oono o.binage,· etc., sp,read in the propagandist press.
"The inoident is one of sllffioiently
terrible order, bo.t as things go in this war
it has res a.lted in less TO la.me of hlllDan
so.ffering than many other oontinuing barbarities in Europe." 1
"There has been nothing in the histor,y of the German raoe." deolared the St. Louis Globe-Demoqrat, "to lend
credib ilit y to storie s of s uo'h a troci ties."

2

The Milwaakee

Free-Press. printed in a distinotly Gennan-Amerioan distriot,
protested against the "Qnfair and insincere" emphasiS which
oo.r newspapers and magazines had laid o.pon the atrooity charges against

~ermany.

It pondered "what these same po.blioations

woo.ld be doing if the J:!'rench and English. or the Russians.
were fighting on German SOil, if they were besieging and taking
German cities. The same destruction would be their lot •••• "

3

The first break in pro-Ally sentiment ooco.rred in
late September, 1914, when England, fighting desperatelY to
halt the German war machine, began to halt Amerioan ships for
searohing. The Wall Street Journal, from the predominantly
pro-Allied east, could find no fao.lt in the action.
1

, Read. oR.

0

it., p. 1 '11.

2

Lit. Dig., XLIX, '11 (Sept. 12, 1914) p. 141.
3

Ibid.) XLIX, 1'1 (Oct. 24, 1914) p. '1'1'1.

If.!.

conduct

friendly and impartial does not make it the d a.ty of the gOTvernment to prevent its oi t izenafroDl trading with any of the
belligerent powers •••• The risk is his own •••• the loading
1
and clearing from port." But a week later when three American
tankerS(headed for

De~ark

were halted, some of the Anerican

reacti on was violen 'ti. "A. fe. more acts of piracy of this British
kind," stated the New York Telegraph, "will force the American
navy into action." Ba.t the Ne. York Journal of Commerge talked
oalmness and fe It "that the r~ is nothing to get exci ted ab oa.t."
Complaining bitterlY of the go-easy polioy of the government,
the Brooklyn bagl. remarked that

".8

need not expect any

displ~

of volcanio indignation from Washington." The ships were Iater
2

released following an offioial government protest.
On December 8, 1914, speaking to Congress, PreSident
Wilson stated that provision for voluntary

mil~tary

training

shoa.ld be extended, and that the organized militia of the states
should be "developed and strengthened."

3

The war in Ea.rope had

oalled attention to th& small size of oa.r army and here began
an agitation for "preparedness." Wilson refa.sed to become alarmed,
. suggesting merely improvement of the militia.
1

2

Lit. Dig., XLIX, 16 (Oot. 17, 1914) p. 725.
Ibid.) XLIX; 18 (Oot. 31, 1914) p. 832.

3
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The oall for .. "preparedne ss· found the edit at" s of the
Literary Digest placing an opinion poll before Ameri can news-

,

paper editors, requesting information as to what size oar Army
and Navy should be. Three qaasti ons were askeel: 1. Are our
na. ti ona 1 de fens es ade quate?; 2. Do you favor a st ronger stand-

ing army?; 3. Do

YOIl

favor a stronger standing navy?

The newspapers participating gave a slight edge to
the preparedness plan. Two hundred am seventy-five felt that
Ollr

defeIlS es were inadeq ll8.te ·'wi t h 119 believing them sllffi-

cient. Two hundred and forty felt that a larger army was necessary with 158 opposed alld 285 favored a larger navy wi. th 109
opposed. The Buffalo Times went so far as to state that "thE\Y
oould see a yellow peril arising," but the idea'of Germany as
1
a potential enemy was not mentioned.
The following month another poll was taken, this time
concerning the prohibiting of arms and ammnnition to warring
nations, as a means of halting the s.truggle and also of assuring
Ollr

Delltra1ity.

FOllr

hundred and forty newspapers replied with

224 stating "no,".167 favoring the prohibiting and 29 being non-

oommital. The answers from cities of 50,000 or over favored the
selling of weapons of war and the smaller towns asked for prohibition by a small majority. The Digest stated "their votes
1

Lit. Dig., L. 4 (Jan. 23, 1915) p. 137.
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1

were baoked by hwndreds of reasons of all sorts."
A boiled-down version of A.imrioan opinion in the
early part of 1916. if the Literary Digest poll was aoourate,
seemed to show the general publio for preparedness in oase the
pr ogram of

De

utrali ty failed. But also with the new year came

the submarine wa. that brought the European straggle oloser
to the Amerioan fireside and was later to oause a general
swibg away from our neutral

polioy~

The first Amerioan oitizen

.

to die from the cfireot result. of \ierman torpedoes was on the
British liner Falaba. The editorial pages roared out their defianoe of the aot. "A orime against humanity," stated the Philadelphia Publio Ledger and the New York Herald-Tribune labeled it "an
assassination." The Journal of Commeroe believed it "an atrooity
against Whioh the oivilized world should protest with one voioe."
and the New York Post condemned it wi t h one word; "piracy. It The
Washington Post oalling for the publio to remain oalm, adopted
a middle-of-the-road attitude and believed the aotion as bad for
2

one side as the other.

Comment from the South and West on this

inoident was not oarried by the Digest, in this or subsequent
issues.
It was on Kay 1, that the Lnaitanla eased out of
her berth in New York and began her last tragio voyage to Europe.
1

Lit. Dig., L. 6 (Feb. 6. 1916) p. 226.
2

Ibid., L, 16 (April 10, 1916) :.. 789.
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"Sails. Undistnrbed by lierman VWarning." declared the Times in
a front page column. The passengers who were aboard co nld not
cre.di t the extremes of ferocity to which maddened nations conld
descend. They even commented lightly on the warning as "silly,
tommy-roL."

1

Bnt Friday. May 7. 124

~erican

lives were lost

with the Lqsitania off the Irish coast.
The following day the morning papers were shonting the
news in bigger and blacker headlines than they had nsed since
the early days of the war, ani their editorial pages were blazing
with horror and indignation. "From onr Department of State."
cried the New York Times. "there mnst go to the Imperial Government at Berlin a demand that the Gemans shall no longer make
war like savages drllnk with blood." The Tribqne closed its philippiC with an appeal to a moving passage in onr history; "The
nation which remembered tb:l sailors of the Maine wi 11 not forget
the ciVilians of the

Ll1Sitania~"

Theodore Roosevelt leaped

shont ing int 0 print. "This represents not merely piracy bnt piraoy on a vaster scale of mnrder than old-time pirates ever practioed." From the violently pro-Ally Northeast the great wave of
shock, ontrage and denllnoiation

~read

thronghont the newspapers.

at least. of every part of the conntry. Only two English-langnage
papers in the United States-- one in St. LOlliS and the other in
L

Bake r,

0».

oi t ., Vol. 5, p. 323.
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Milwaukee-- OOD.ld be found defending the sinking.
COmmeroial-Appeal was

~ea~

l~e

¥erp.phi8

"to oonsider a deolaration of war."

from LOD.isVille the Toice of Henry Watterson thnndered in vivid
imagery:
"TrD.ly, the Nation of the black hand
and bloody heart has got in its work ••••
The deoree of Satan went forth from ~erlin.
The instruments of ~atan were forged at
Essen. There was but a single ~atanio abatement. ~atan's ambassador at Washington-shameless in his infam:y, a.nder the sign
'manoal of Satan's Embassy, insolent in ita
disregard of law or oonsequenoes-- gave
warning.. •• Shall any j IlS t man say tha. t
Coa.nt Von Bernstorff is not guilty of
marder? This holy Sabbath every pD.lpit
in Amerioa should send a prayer to God in
protest •••• and more than all the Christian president of the United States, a 0001
and brave man, sprung from a line of heroes
and saints-- oeasing longer to protest,
should aot, leaving no doubt •••• that he is
•••• a leader of men and nations and that
he holds aloft the ~word of the Lord and
Gideon."
"Oondemnati on of the aot t
Literary

Diges~

II

as the edi tors of the

were foroed to leave it, "seems to be limited

only by the restrictions of the English language." The language had hardly given out before the penoila of the oartoonI.

ists were reinforotng it with every kind of stirring and terrible visoal appeal. The preaohers sprang to follow Marae Henry's
advioe. A few, like Bishop Greer, oould nrge the nation to
think oalmly; more typioal was the ory of the

~ev.

John Henry

Jowett that "it is a oolossal sin against God and it is premeditated murder." The New York Sqn felt that the loss of the

Lusi tania, '.'was no different from the other sinkings exoept
in size, but realized that a lot more exoi tell2nt had been
created."

1

But. the reaction of the Northeast was not the reaction
of the nation. Secretary of

Agricultur~David

F. Houston, hap-

pened to be in California when the disaster caDI:!. He was to maet
a delegation of Los Angeles business men that morning; the Secretary was full of the news, but tba business men merely "talked
for a few minutes about the

~rage~

without excitement" and did

not mention the subject again through the reat of a long morning.
"Nor. did any reporter of any local newspaper seek to interview
me on the matter," though Mr. Hoo.ston was one of the most influential members of the Cabinet. "No citizen brought it up
during the remainder of
.

eral weeks."

2

my

stay in the west which lasted sev-

The overwhelming consensus appeared to be that

the PreSident should instantly compel Germany to disavow, to
make reparation and to abandon her submarine war, but at the
same time making sare not to get the United States into trouble.
"The American people," as the Savannah News observed, "don't
want their government to be placed in the position of retreating
3

from any position it has taken."
1

. Lit. Dig., L, 20 (May 15, 1915) p. 1133.
2

.

MilliS, OR. oit., p. 174.
3

Ibid., p. 175.
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Wilson's attempt to preserve calm was criticized by
some. Three days after the sinking of the Lusi tania, President
Wilson addressing 15,000 recently naturalized citizens in Philadelphia, stated: "There is such a thing as a man being too
proud to fight. There is such. a thing as a mtion being so right
that it does not need to convince
right."

1

ot~rs

by force tmt it is

The New York Times expressed the solemn opinion that

"this utterance of the President does not respond to the feeling
of the pe ople." The Whi te HollS e was flooded ins tant ly with telegrams of condemnat,ion; and before the swift storm of elegant
disapproval the President was weak. enough to announce that the
speech had been made without reference to the Lusitania. The
loyal World hastened to express it s rel ie fat this disavowal.
"We have a pride that will make us fight," it said, "Let there
2

be no illusion on this score in Berlin or

else~here."

Henry

Cabot Lodge, promenent member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and political opponent of the President, felt that the
statement "shocked him the same as many others and I never again
recovered confidence in Mr. Wilson's ability to deal with the most
perilous situation which had ever confronted the united States,
3

in relatiOns with the other nations of the earth.The note of President Wilson following the sinking of
the Lusitania stated that he would hold the Germans to strict
1

Baker,

OPe

cit., Vol. 5, p. 334.

2

3

Millis,

OPe

Cit., p. 178.

Lodge, Henry Cabot: The Senate and the League of Nations, p. 32.
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"accountability" and his firmness, untouched by hysteria, seemed
to meet public favor. 'The second note was more severe and caused
Secretary of State Br,yan's resignation.
~ryan's

Public reaction to

resignation was divided. The

Mob ile Register stated. "If Germany is misled int 0 acti ons still
further violative of our rights, the resultant hostility will be
largely attributable to Mr. Bryan, whose sole idea is peace", and
the Philadelphia hegord sarcastically added, "The biggest popular
vote he will ever receive
,

.

wi~l

be in endorsing his resignation."

But in the West and Southwest Bryan was given the benefit of the
doubt. The St. LOllis ReRllblic added, ".American people will not
fail to give Mr. Bryan filII credit for his sincerity, his patrotism, his good spirit, bllt in the issue now joined the country
is with the president." The Socialist New York Call condemned
the capitalists with a sweeping statement. "The DIlPonts and
Sahwabs have at last pried from President Wilson's cabinet the
last piece of timber that resollltely barred the door against
war."

1

It was at this time that the J!'rench and their pos i tion
2

in world affairs were placed before the Ame ri can pllblic.

lla

Olltloolt for May 12, 1916, carried an article entitled, "Plain
1

Lit. Dig_, L, 26 (June 19, 1915) pp. 1449-1450.
2

Literary Digest carries no report on American action towards
in the same manner or style in which Great ~ritain is
criticized. Reports are of a general nature dealing mostly with
her war effort.
~he

Fr~nce
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worde froll Ameri oa to Sister Nati ons in

~Ilrope,

11

by ItCivie Amer-

ieanns." To .irranoe the writ er said:
"We shall never forget your friendship and help in the days when we won our
freedom •••• We oannot see that this war is
in any way one of your ohoosi ng or of YOIlr
making. No threat of yours, ho olaim of
yours, entered into the witohes oauldron.
"You have not talked muoh, but YOIl
have fou.gjli; well. YOIl have suffered enormously, bu.t you. have not lost Yollr nerve •
•••• Yoar silent General, you.r silent soldiers, your sober self-saorifioi ng people
bave rmde a splendid reoord." 1
Franoe reoei ved fu.ither praise from Wayne MaoVeigh
in the North Amerigan Reyiew for July, 1915. MaoVeigh stated:

"I know nothing more snblime in all history than
the passi on for liberty whioh animates today the ohildren of
Franoe in their oombatfor their oountry and for the world
2
against the orushing foroes of Attila's Hu.na."
Franoe was praised frequently for not oarrying on
the oampaign of propaganda that Britain and Germany had nndertaken; she was praised for sharing Amerioan ideals of demooraoy;
she was praised beoause her aotionbad disproved ~tions Ollrrent in Amerioa of her deoadenoe, oorruption, and instability.
The Philadelphia Horth Amerioan on July'. 1915 stated that they
I

were surprised to find her so "quiet" and "stubborn."
" •••• the stirring thing is that lrranoe the frivolous,
1
2

White, Elizabeth Brett: Amerio an Opinion of France, p. 2'3.
Loo. oit.

·'0.

Franoe the debonair, Franoe the oarefree and la ughterloving,
has met the supreme ordeal of her existence in a manner to
teach t he whole world Ie ssons of steadiness, of sobriety, of
dogged courage, of concentrated efficienoy, and of nncomplaining
1

saorifioe."
Henry Watterson had a kind word for the French.
"I have not loved Paria as a Parisian,
bnt as an American •••• I used to love to go
there and to behold the majesty of France. I
have always known What all the world now knows,
that beneath the gayety of the ..I!'renoh there
burns a patriotic snd consuming fire, a high
sense of pnblic honor; a fine ~irit of freedom •••• Alone they did it -- the ..I!'renoh people
-- the bard-.orking, frugal, loyal oommonalty
of Franee-- withont asking the loan of a son
from the world outSide." 2
Proof that the .Amerioan press oould still see both
sides of a problem when so desired, occurred in June, 1916,
with the annoruncement that Italy had entered the war on the side
of the Allies. "Cold-blooded caloa.lation, If remarked the Philadelphia Inqgirer and the Washington Past saw "territorial covetons" as the reason. The Augu.sta Chroni,cle called the action
"treachery" and the New York World remarked that "Morally she
stands with Germany. Both tore np treaties of international
signifioanoe." The Milwaukee Free-Press oalle d the entry one
"of the blackest ohapters of the war" and the New York PQlt
stated."That it must be assumed that the Allies outbid Germany."
1

White, Ope cit., p. 2'13.

2

Watterson, Henry: Marse Henry an Antobiography, Vol. 2, p. 69.

Few papers defended the action of the Italian government. des1

pite her linkage to the Allied oallse.
Col. Edward M. HOllSe, personal advisor to President
Wilson, writing to Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister,
June 17, 1915, snmmarized Amerioan pllblic opinion:
" •••• the vast majority of our people
desire the President to be very firm ·in his
attitQde towards Germany and yet avoid war.
They have told me that in their opinion the
oOllntry was willing to accept the conseqllencese"2
A like opinion was.expressed by several newspapers

the same month, following the announcement that additional American lives ha.d been lost wi th the sinking of the British liner,
Arabio.

In the East the New York World annollnced that "every

passenger ship, regardless of flag flying. presllmably oarries
Amerioan oitizens," while the Tribune believed that it was "time
to aot; withollt delay give the German ambassador his passport."
The West also baoked t he East with the Phoenix Rep Ilb ligan, the
Cheyenne Leader and the Salt T1ke Tribune

calling for a "ruptllre

of diplomatio relations." The Literary Digest cOllld find bllt one
paper,. the .German-American Cinoinnati VOlksblatt plaoing the
blame anywhere bllt on the Imperial government. "Diffiolllties,"
the Volksblatt stated. "with Germany cOllld be easily averted if
1

Lit. Dig., L, 26' (June 26. 1915) p. 1543.
2

Seymollr, Ubarles: The Intimate Papers of Colonel HOllse, p. 12.
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Amerioans would plaoe themselves under the proteotion of their
1

own flag and not of a foreign co Ill1try. "
Realizing the situation the nation was in, President
Wilson fought for peace but at the same time he was determined
to be prepared in case his plans failed. His previous oall for
preparedness without oonsoription (December 8, 1914) ooupled
with his St. Louis speech when he asserted that the Amerioan Navy
"ought in my opinion, to be incomparably the greatest navy in the
world, n brought praise from

~.he

editors for what might have been

two widely separate reasons. The Washington Post, whioh had been
maintaining a middle-of-the-road attitude, felt that "we have the
biggest job-- we need the biggest navy." The Milwaukee Sentinel,
the only Ameri can paper labeled by Wellington House as being
2

pro-German

felt the same way. "We must have enough power," the
3

editor stated, "to defend the freedom of the seas."

Apathy in

Congress and dissension in his own party foroed PreSident Wilson,
as the Cleveland Plain Dealer remarked. to oarry the oase for
preparedness before "the real court of authority-- the men and
women of the United States." Sectional feelings also flared up
~.g.,~l?-ln.?ort

of the President's oall for preparedness and the

1·

Lit. Dig., LI. 9 (Aug. 28, 1915) p. 387.

2

Peterson,
3

Ope

Cit., p. 164.

Lit. Dig., LII, 8 (Feb. 19, 1916) p. 419.

Winston-Salem Journal believed that the "people of the midwest.
not milch

Vi)

rked up over preparedness wi 11 be awakened by the

President_" The New York World called for the facts. stating that
the "president is entitled to a hearing •••• and had handled the
foreign affairs of the country during the most trying period sinoe
the oivil war." The Press editor, seeking to look into the heart
of the oall stated, "He still bates the sword •••• his heart is
1

not in it."
At the olose of

Fe~ruary,

1916, the Literary Digest

editors plaoed another poll before the editors of the Amerioan
press, this time asking. 1. What should be the size of the Army
and the Navy? 2. Is militarism a peril to Amerioa? The answers
proved to

b~

almost an even split on the latter question with

the biggest oomplaint being that the President would oontrol
the looal militda aver the voioe of the governor if taken into
2

federal servioe which would make for too much patronage.
aging up the figures submitted from

Aver-

600 editors the Digest foand

them asking for a larger regular army of 286,078 with a reserve
of 1,216,369. Forty per cent wanted a navy seoond only to Britain
with the remainder asking for the largest in the world. Along
the Atlantio seaboard only 11 editors feared the rise of mi1itarism with 85 seeing no harm in an inorease in the services.
1

2

L~ t. D~£ ••

Lll, 6 (Feb. 6, 1916 ) p. 269.

Ibid., LII, 10 (March 4, 1916) p. 647.
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Further west the editors oalled for a smaller anny but a still
1

larger navy and the fear of militarism was still strong.
The raid on Columbus, New Mexioo, March 9, 1916 by
bandi ts nnder the leadership of Panaho Villa gave people oalling
for preparedness an additional argument. The new Seoretary of
War, Newton D. Baker, who had taken over Maroh 9,1916, following
the resignation of Lindley M. Garrison due to President Wilson's
failure to baok his proposed plan for oonsoript ion, was already
on reoord for preparedness
; 1

i~

possi ble wi thont consoription.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer,already on reoord as baoking
Secretary Baker and a preparedness plan, oalled it an "example of
what nnpreparedness means."- The Kansas City Star pondered the idea
of what might have happened and "suppose it had been a first olass
power, instead of a bandit?" Col. Edwin F. Glenn, ohief of staff
of the Eastern Divis ion of the Army, .and a man fully entrusted
with na.tional seonrity stated, "The oold fact is that the Amerioan
army today is the most pathetio thing any nation ever knew or
oontemplated, and other nations know it very well, loan assure
you." Machine gnns had failed and transportation was far from
2

suooessfn1.
A report by two British jonrnalists on the Amerioan
press was pnblished in September, one defending and one oondemning
1

Lit. Dig., LII, 11 (Maroh 11, 1916) p. 617.
2

Ibid., LI1, 14 (April 1, 1916) p. 883.
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,1

Amerioan opinion towards the Allies. Both were probably biased.
Arraon Watson, following a cross-conntry trip stated:
"Going west the less int erest there
seems to be in t he events, whioh are making
a oharnel honse of Europe.
"A.merica. has no jonrnalist who makes
an expert stndy of the war •••• and. there is
no demand that the newspapers shall snpply
complete and nnb iased news."

Mr. H. S. Perris, also a jonrnalist, after a trip to
Chicago reported:

"I~elieve,

on the oontrary, that
no press in the world has, on the whole
been more fnlly informed. of the nnderlying
oauses and issues of the war, and the general course of events, than the leading
j onmals of the United States." 1
Both reports were probably true to a certain extent.
The West was little interested in the condu.ct of European affairs,
but it was stretohing a point to

s~

that no American jonrnalist

had nade an "expert study of the war." Recognizing that American
news came largely through British hands, mny AIIBrican journals
were still printing both sides of the story as gar as possible.
At 8:30, Saturday evening, .it'ebruary 24, 1917, there
arrived in the

~tate

Department a sensational cable from Mr. Page,

our Ambassador to England. The British Foreign Minister, Mr.
Balfour, the Ambassador reported, had just handed him the text of
a cipher telegram from Zimmerman, Geman Foreign Minister, to the
Imperial Government's Ambassador to Mexico, which had been trans1

!l!1i.) LIt

11 (Sept. 11, 1916) pp. 528-529.
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:-

,

mitted on Janaary 19. through the Amerioan Embassy in Berlin to
the German Embassy in Washington.
"We intend to begin on the 1st of
Febr uary unrest rioted so. brnarine warfare.
We shall endeavour in spite 0 f this to
keep the Un! ted States of Amerioa De utraJ..
In the event of this not suooeeding we nake
Mexioo a proposal of allianoe on the following basis; mke war together. make peaoe
together, generous finanoial sllpport and
an Wlderstanding on Ollr part tla t Mexioo
is to reoonquer the 100 t territory in
Texas. New Mexioo and Arizona. You will
inform the President of the above most
seoretly as soon as the ont break of war
with the united States is oertain and add
the snggestion that he shonld, on his own
initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherenoe •••••• " 1
The reaotion of the Amerioan press was violent while
the German-.Amerioan press oonld

"se~"

fraud ani British triokery

wri tten throughout the message. The Springfield Repnblioan. already anti-German, oalled it the voioe that oonld "solidify
Amerioa," and the OShkosh Northwesterner remarked. "Patriotism
has been fanned into a flame of fervent loyalty." The St. Lonis
AmeriJta dec 1ared "no he si tation in deolaring it a forgery,"
while the New York Fatherland labeled it, IIbrazen forgery; impndent hoax." The Milwaakee Free-Press, oalled the only

pro~German

Amerioan newspaper printed in English, remarked it was a note
2

"which even a sohoolboy's sense should suspeot of spnrionsness."
Bnt there can be no donbt as to its gennineness' for Zimmerman when
confronted for reasons for his aotion stated that "Germany in
1

..!It.i!., LIV, 10 (Maroh 10. 1917) p. 607.

2

Ibid" LIV. 11 (Maroh 17, 1917) p. 687.
!
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1

order to win the war needed Allies."
The press as a whole supported the aation of arming
our Imrchant vessels, following the pa.bliaation of the

Zi~rman

note, and tm Boston Joornal believed that the "oa.taome aommonly
expeated is war." The Detroit Journal felt that the President
"has taken the right ao a.rse and dangeroa.s, If while the Milwaa.kee.
Joornal believed the "aation will be endorsed by every ai tizen."
The Nashville Tennessean, a little more aonservative, felt that
"90 per aent of the people Wi.ll applal1d him," and the Chiaago
Herald aoa.ld see "no ta.rning back." The New York Sun attempted to
speak for the State Department and rems. rked, "Government offi2

oials exp ect war unless Germany do es an aboa.t face."
Following a meeting of the Cabinet, Marah 20, the
Li terary Digest. rep orted that we changed from "armed ne a.trali ty"
3
to "a state of war." Commenting on the aoming session of Congress,
most of the Ar:reriaan press seemed to feel the salm way.

II

It wi 11

be the duty of Congress to recognize the fact of war and aa.thorize the President .... " , stated tre New York Ti1I8s. The Boston
Transcript felt that "Germany was at war wi th
a t war with Geruany.!l 1)he New York

~Ir

I1S,

and we shol11d be

ib llAe ,wan ted to know "what

we were going to do abol1t it?l'and the' Cleveland Press believed
4

"war is inevitable."
1

2

Halsey, Frana is Whi ti~, The Literary Di£est History of the
World War, Vol. 4, p. 15; see also Enay. Brit. Vol. 23, p. 960.
Lit. Dig., LIV, 12 (March 24, 1917) p. 801.

3

Ibid" LIV, 13 (Marah 31, 1917) p. 881.
4

Loa. ai t.
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The aation of Congress, April 6, 1917, in deolaring
war aga.inst Germany foUnd

t~

.Arneria'an press Ilni ted behind the

aall to arms. 1'he Chiaago Herald stated; "If this, indeed, be
not the voiae of the nation, we are not fit to be a mtion," and
the Courier-Journal remar1red that it was the "most signifiaant
and momentous deliveranae on the part of the An:eriaan people
sinae the Dealaration of Independenae." The Boston Transaript
heard the voi ce of the people wi th the remark, "the president
has heeded the mandate of the,people." The pro-German press and
the German-American press also fell into line. The Milwaukee
Free-Pre'ss );8triotically aalling that "where the flag leads all
America will follow" and the llew York Staats-Zeitmv cOllld see
1

one goal and "b ut one duty -- .A.ue r iaa. n

-<>.

1

Lit. Dig., LIV, 15 (April 14, 1917) p. 1002.
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\

"

IV. THE REACTION OF CHURCH AND PACIFIST GROUPS.

Where God hath a temple.
the devil will have a chapel •.
Robert Burton
Anatomy .of Melancholy

general found the American clergy oondemning the warring nations and asking for peaoe. The BiShop of the Protestant Episoopal diooese of New York, Dr. David H. Greer, was one of the
first to oall for peaoe. publishing a prayer for use in the
ohurohes of his diooese during the war stating,

uWe are bre-

thren •••• open the eyes of the people •••• ha.tred and violenoe
is weakness •••• bri ng to a speedy end.... war shall be no
1
mor e • " The last pro 0 lama t i on of Pope Pi us X was is sued th e
day of· his death (Augast 19, .1914) oal.ling to all Roman Uatholios to pray for the "speedily removal of the evil oauses of
2
war, giving to thea who rule to think the thoughts of peaoe."
The Rev. Fiederiok Lynoh writing in the Christian Work and
Evangelist (nondenominational), August 29, 1'14, stated that
"Christianity has been thrown to the dogs, am the na. tiona
3
have gone mad." The Lutheran (Philadelphia) organ of the
Evangelioal Lutheran Church of North Amerioa agreed; "All
nations have drunk deep at the well of irreligion and mannom4
ism •••• all nations are equally to blame."
Bev. Holden E. Sampson of the Corpus Christi
1

Lit. Dig., XLIX, 8 (Aug. 22, 1914) p. 312.
2

Ibid., XLIX, 9 (Aug. 29, 1914) p. 329.
3

4

~. XLIX, 11 (Sept. 12, 1914) p. 463.
I

Ibid' l XLIX, 13 (Sept. 26, 1914) p. 578.
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Churoh of New York Cit y. was one of the few vo ioes

0

f dissent.

Writing in the New York World he stated. "war is not all bad •
••• there are some good things •••• we are too self-oentered am
1
shrink from death."
The nation's response to the President's call for
prayers for peaoe "oould not have been more general or more
2

fervent n in the words of the New Yorlc Times. The Livl ng
Chgrgh (Milwaukee) added that the nation should "pray for
3
.
internat ional pe aoe. n Whatever the 00 ursa and final settlement of the war, stated the BroOklyn Eagle, the pOSition of
the Catho.lio Churoh has been demonstrated in the
oent enoyolioal.
4
it."

~No

~ope's

re-

oritia in the world oan misunderstand

By Christmas of 1914 members of the ministerial
groups were aoti vely engaged in the llrnerioan League to Limit
Armaments to aombat the foroes cAlling for inoreased defense.
Those engased inaluded Bishop David H. Greer, Peray Stiokney
Grant of the Churoh of the Asaensi on, New York City. and
William Pierson Merrill, minister of the Briok Presbyterian
1

!W..,

2
3

p. 5'18.

Ibid. , XLIX, 16 (Oat. 1'1, 1914) p. '142.
Loa. a1 t.

4

Ibid., XLIX, 23 (Dea. 6, 1914) p. 1126.
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Chnrch of New York City. Bishop Greer also headed the Chnroh
Peaoe Union and maintained 'that "peaoe will never be obtained
by the nse of foroe. The teachings of Christ. the IlBnmr of
his life and of his death, were proof that he wonld be opposed
to war."

1

The efforts of the 180ifis t o rganizati ons to enlist

.

ohnroh snpport tended to increase the antagoniSm of some of
the olergy/towards them. Dr. Cb::Lrles A. Eaton wanted to know
"who are these pe ople

imposi~

.

on Simple half-baked women,

making their hasbands hang their heads in shame?" Maloom J.
llaoLeod oouldn't believe that ifJull8 were living in the
present he would be a paoifist; "I believe there are times
when to be a paoifist is to be perilonslynear being a traitor."

2

Dr. Walter Rausohenbnsoh of the RoohesterTheologioal

Seminary,writing in the Congregationalist (Boston), first
oonfessed to Gennan desoent and then stated "there is not a
nation at war whioh has not aome jnstifioation and some
spiritllal values at stake." He defended u-ermany bnt not to the
extreme. stating, "Nations rarely fight for moral issnes alone."
The governor of 8onneotiout, aotive in the work of the Baptist
1

Abrams, OPt oit •• p. 24.
2

Ibid., p. 45.
3

Lit. Dig., XLIX, 19 (Nov. 7, 1914) p. 892.

3

Chlltoh, requested the churches "to gather a census of the state's
1

war material in men."
:Che Literary Digest could see no division along denomp
inational lines in the ministerial stand against an increase in
armaments and stated "there is no significance in the fact that
it is the Protestanib Christian Work (New York) which believes

Mr. Bryan's peace treaties worth a big anny.in every state." The
CatholiC response was the same. The Catholic Monitor (Newark)
stated, "It is to the credit .of oor people that they are s incerely desirous of peace." All denominations called for "moral rearmament."

2

In his struggle to coniJat militarism, Dr. Frederick

Lynch wrote in The Christian Work. "Our noise in the world is not
measured by oar guns. Our safety does not depend upon our navy but
upon our reputation."

3

But what attitude would churchmen take when war's problems came closer to our shores? A survey of the opinions of church
I,

leaders of the nation was published by the New tork Times. M8y 10.
1915, three days after the Lusitania was torpedoed. Collecting

pulpi t expressi ons the Times re ported that the general reacti on
of the clergy was: "A crime against civilization; an act not to
be condoned; not piracy but organized murder; abhorrent even to
1

Abrams, OPe cit., p. 46.
2

Lit. Dig., XLIX, 26 (Dec. 26, 1914) p. 1281.

3

Ibi

d.,

L, 11 (March 15 t 1915) p. 551.

the standards of bloody war." The Rev. John Henry Jowett stated,
"It is a oolossal sin against God and it is premeditated murder,"
and Rev. Henry Sloane Coffin saw the aotion as a oonfliot between
1

"barbarism and oivilization."

The Times editorialized. "Possibly

some of the olergy have oounseled turning too other oheek, but if
2

so we ba. ve not seen the ir words in print."

But some words were in

print. 1'he Rev. John Haynes Holmes of too Churoh of the Messiah.
New York, stated." •••• show that

A~rioa

belives in peaoe",

while .l:(ev. J. F. Keller of th:e Evangel ieal Lutheran' Church. Cleveland, remarked, "These passengers were warned before they sailed ••
•• war is war."

a

The influeno'e of nati onal or !gins is seen in some

oases. In Ohioago, an appeal was pub lished on ,Saturday, May 8,
in several Uhioago newspaper articles signed by Lutheran olergymen, calling upon the German pastors in the interest of "truth
and justice" to call t:Q,e attention of their congregations to the
fact that "the German government had been forced by England to
the horrible steps, and, aooording to international law, is not
responsib Ie for the loss of .American

life.~·

One Lutheran past or
4

pOinted out that the passengers had oommitted suioide.
1

Ab raIIB t
2

0» •

ci t ., p. 28.

Lit. Dig., L; 21

a
4

(~ 22, 1916) p. 1218.

Loo. 01 t.

Abrams, OPe oit., p. 28.
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The loss of Amerioan lives due to sublIBrine s p1aoed
the ward "preparedness" foremost in the minds of many

~erioans.

The Seonrity League had already issued a oa11 for increased
armaments and tlE younger business men and millionaires, baok
now from the ir bloodless trenohes at Plattsb urg, were organizing the Military Training Camp Assooiation to put more powerful pressures than General Wood himself oould exert upon the
Congress about to oonvene. Colleges were adopting Reserve
1

Offioers Training Corps.
Both the Congregational and Disoip1es of Christ
Churohes struok baok against this oall wi th offioial statements. 1'he National Counoil of the Congregational Churoh,
meeting at

~ew

Haven, Conn. t passed a resolution pointing out

" •••• the futility of gigantio armazoonts as the guaranty of
2

international seourity and justioe."

The Uhristian Century

(Chicago) the offioial organ of the Disoiples of Christ,
remarked that it was "time for religion to enter polit ios
3
to strive against militarism."
With the arrival of the new year (1916) The Literary
Digest felt that "while much of the paoifist sentiment has
1

Millis.

OPe

01 t.,

p. 235.

2

Lit. Dig., LIt 21 (Mov. 20, 1915) p. 1009.
3

Ibid,,24 (Deo. 11, 1915) p. 1266.
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emanated from clergymen, it appears to be an error to look
upon this body of men as a whole as holding to the doctrine
of non-resistance ani opposing the wide-spread sentiment in
favor of preparedness," and published a poll of Presbyterian
ministers taken by !he Continent (Chicago). The Digest editors
also felt that a complete nation-wid,e view was impossible due to
the scarcity of Presbyterian ministers in the

~ew

England and

Southern states.
The poll:
1. Are you in favor of complete
disarmament by the united States?
Yes, 95; No, 305; No vote, 29.
2. Are you in favor of an Army
and Navy sufficient in numbers and
effiency to wi thstand ordinary attack
while new for'ces are being organized?
Yes, 375; No, 60; No vote, 37.
3. Are you afraid of the dangers
of militarism?
Yes, 115; No, 278; No vote, 37.
4. Assuming that all war is wrong
should we ignore the possibility of attack
by some nation whiah does not aacept tba.t
belief?
Yes, 76; No, 278; No vote, 47.

5. A variety of reasons were given
as to the best me thod of defens e.
The editor of the Seattle Post-Intelligenaer, probably
finding the results of the poll agreeing with his own ideas, stated
that the "Presbyterians are a good aross-seation of the aountry ••
• ~ the doctrine of national preparedness is decidely more popular
in this country than had been supposed. n
1

Ibid.J LIlt 2 ,( Jan. 8., 1916) p. 156.
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1

About the same time a poll of ministers of
nominations in Brooklyn; conducted by the Daily

twenty~ie

~agle.

fo~d

a

large majority favoring preparedness. A total of 151 favored an
increase in armaments wi th six qra1ifying theJr approval and but
14 opposed. The Eagle. probably remembering that the ordination
into the ministry does not insure one against cultural infauences,
editorialized. "It seems that ministers in a given

local~ty

are

perhaps affected by the same influences as other citizens and are
just as good patriots as

la~en.n

1

Charles A.

Eaton~

through. the

pages of The Independent (March. 1916) gave assurances that "this
war is the greatest blessing that has ever fallen on mankind Since
2

the berman Reformation."
Sunday, October 4, 1915, the #Jay set aside by President
Wilson for prayers for peace, was widely observed in the churches.
The New lork Times featured the occasion on the front page: WHOLE
NATION FRaYS FOli PEACE. Most of the clergy caught the spirit of
the day, making strong appeals. Bishop William Lawrence of Massachusetts believed that "people were becoming convinced that war
was wickedness, useless, and stupid." Malcolm James MacLeod, of
the Collegiate Ohurch of Saint Nicholas, New York City, asked his
hearers to "think: of the dead boys today, the maimed ani the
crippled. I don't care whether they are Germans, English or Russ1

Ibid., LII, 15 (April 8, 1916)p. 972.
2

Abrans,

OPe

cit., p. 33.
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,\

'ians. They are all their mother's sons and the

sa~redness o~

human life is degraded. Worst of all is the moral degradation
1

and the legaay of ha. tea ..
The Bri tish government, realizing the value of having
the olergy

speaki~

for the Allied oause, published a book in

1915 entitled Sixty Amerioan Opinions on the War and the names

of oertain olergymen found their way into the pages. One of
them was Frank Isley Paradise. reotor of

~raoe

Churoh, West

Medford, Mass., who in January, 1915, had said from his pulpit:
"At length, Id 0 believe we shall
oatohthe spir'it of battle, and fling baok
the ohallenge of Gennan nationalism. For
we too have a oonsoious national destiny.
The God of Israel has annointed us to ohampion the oause of the poor, the weak, and
the down-trodden. We too shall struggle
for world power. It Will be the healing
power of Christian oivilization." 2
But statements;!suoh as these were the exoeption, rather
than the role.
President Wilson's oall for peace following his re-eleotion (Deoember 18, 1916) found supnort in the p'ages of The Amerio§n
Hebrew. "We oount it more than fortunate that we bave at the head
of the nation a man who towers head and shoulders not only above
our statesmen, but also above the trained statesmen of Europe ••••
a burning passion for peaoe and righteousness."
1

2
3

Ibid., p. 22.
.

.!J!19."

p. 27.

Lit. Dig., LIV, 1 ,(Jan. 6, 1917) p. 24.
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I

a

Pollowing the German note of January 31, 1917, notifying the world of unrestrioted submarine warfare and making our entry
into the war a.lmost inevitable, The Living Church (Milwallkee) and.
The Churchman (New York) weloon:ed tl:e sllggeation of the Episoopalian Bishop "to place flags in all our ohllrohes to teaoh the relationship of the ohurch to 1Btriotism and its Christian express1

ion."
. Follow ing the rllpture of diplomatic relati ons (Maroh 4)
and desp ite the isolated aoti.ons of oertain ministers in oont inlling
their fight for peaoe, the

~ew

York Federation of Chllrohes deoided

to "mobilize its Christian strength behind President Wilson, pledging to him all the servioe of whioh we are severally and oolleotively oapable and to make a stand for the immediate establishment
of llniversal servioe." Sllnday, Maroh 11, 1917 was designated as
"War Sllnday" in the New York Churohes. One hllndred and fifty-eight
ohllrohes favored the oall with 52 voting against it. Hesults:
Presbyterian, 27 for, 22 against; Baptist, 16 for, 1 against; Congregation~list,

10 for, 0 against; Episoopal, 27 for, 3 against;

Methodist, 23 for, 4 against; Reformed, 19 for, 3 against. Voting
in a group the Evangelioal Assooiation, the Sooiety of J,!'riends,
the German Bvangelioal SynOd, the Lutheran Danish, the Heformed
Episoopal and Universalist rejeoted the motion 11 to 2.
Some ministGrs proolain:ed the "Holy War" from many
plllpits. In Brooklyn, Dr. Newell uWight Hillis brollght his oongregation to its feet in un-eoclesiastioal oheers with his
1

Ibid.., LIV. 8 (Feb. 24, 1917) p. 473.
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sermon: "Why We Should Go to

v~ar

with Germany." A resolution

in favor of conscription and pledging support for war _as
adopted by 158 congregations in the city. "Our churches," said
the Reverend Uharles A. Eaton in the Madison Avenue Baptist
Churah, "have been preaching what amounts to a moral asphyxiation. Pacifists affliat the country •••• They make me want
to swear, pray, laugh and weep.n It was a performance echoed
1
in countless otb3 r ci ties.
The annoUDaezoont that Congress would meet in special
session, Monday, April 2, 1917, focused public attention on what
,
was elpected to be the President's war message. A survey of
the churches of .L'Jew York City found mili tancy again rising from
the pulpit. Rev. Newell Dwight Hillis in Henry Ward Beecher's
Church stated. "It is the solemn duty to send to Europe ••••

mon~,

soldiers and guns in the

~atio~rance

sent to America.-

The congregation immediately drew up a resolut ion, asking Congress
2

to declare war.

Rabbi Samuel Sch u.lman of Temple Bet.h-e 1, toned

down his call for war, but

as"~ed

impression to go abroad tba t the'

for a united front,If •••• no
count~y

is divided." A CatholiC

sppkesman, Father Jahn· Hu.ghes of the Paulist .I!'athers, echoed the
3
cry. "We priests are ready and I say 'God bless u.s.'"
1

l!il.)

LIV, 12 (March 24, 1917) p. 820.

2

Ibid.) 15 (April 14, 1917) p. 1064.
3

Loc. ci t.
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There was at least one New York minister of the Gospel Wh 0 refllsed to be swept

aw~

by the tides of war emoti on.

At the Chllrah of the Messiah at Park Avenue ani 34th Street,
the Reverend Mr. John Haynes HOlmes, a worker for peace since
the

011 tbreak

of the European strllggle, refused to alter his

opinion and his morning sermon was a passionate deolaration
of faith:
"If war is right, then Christianity is
wrorg. false, a. lie •••• No order of a. President or a Governor .wi 11 pers Ilade me or for ce
me tot his b Ilsine ss of killiIlS.... Other
olergymen may pray to God for victory far
Ollr arms. I will not. In this church, if nowhere else, the ~ermans will still be included in the family of GOd's ohildren." 1
Reverend

Mr. Holmes' sermon gave his trllstees a bad

afternoon. "Dr. Holmes is an idealist, ff one of them explained
to the reporters, bllt this was not "the time to put his idealism
into practice. We are not going to lie down and let
anyb ody else wipe IIp the floor wi th

llS....

~ermany

or

The Church of the

·1

Messiah is going to fight first •••• to protect Amerioan right
and Amerioan lives, and after we bave protected them we will go
2

on with our ideals."
Some of the most extended efforts in the field of
propaganda were made in the religi ous fields, b Ilt as to it s effect
we may only surmise on the faot that the rna. j ori ty of the ch urches
1

Ibid., p. 1064.
2

Millis, OPt ci tt, p. 429.
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blessed our entry into the war. Wellington HOllS e, the headquarters
for British

propaganda~

sent appeals to all religions sects but \

speci alized on Episcopalians, because of the ir British background
ani the Catholics, due to the large number of Irish in the church.
.

Theypopularized and almost canonized Cardiml Mercier.

I

A vast

amount of literature was sent to AllBrican priests and preachers
am many news stories seem to have been eomposed espeeially for
2

their benefit.

The flaming vocabulary of religion still has the

power to move the hearts at

~ny

men,. and it is a poor propagan ..

dist who negleets the spiritual and ecclesiastical interpreta.
3
tion of the war by the SPokesman of every sect. "The churehes
of pract ically every description can be relie d upon to b less a
popular war, and to see in it an opport unity for the triumph of
4
whatever (;Odly design trey choose to further."
The following week after our official entry int
the Literary Dig es t

00

0

the war,

uld not fi nd one offici al eh ur ch sp okesman

crying out for peace. The Methodist, Congregationalist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic and Episcopal echoed the eall of the people.
1

Desire Joseph Mereit r: Belgi urn Cardinal, Archbishop of Maline s
and primate of jjelgium. 1851-1926. Noted for his fearless and
determined attitude against the invading ~ennans. Received by
King and Queen of England, 12 Sept., 1914, in celebration. On
death of Pope Pius X, Freneh and English Cardinals proposed him
for Pope. German ani Austrian against move ealling it, "a'hurch
in pOlities."
2

Peterson,

OPt

Cit., p. 28.

Lasswe 11,

OPe

c1 t., p. 71.

3

4

.!..B!.S.,

j

p. 73 •
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Even the Society of b'riends (Quaker, 'Philadelphia) whose fai th
forbade them to bear ai-rna informed the government tlBt "organiza1
tion and systematic givi~' is our duty."
Despite the war-like stand taken by a IIBjority of the
clergy, other church leaders, as mentioned acove, were working
daily for the cause of peace. It was a long hard struggle, for
organizations, sllch as the

~ational

Seourity League, were pub-

ldlshing a most oonvinoing type of anti-paoifist propaganda.
n In t he vooabu~ary of the league
the terns 'German, 'pro-lZernan, paoifist, 1
and 'anti-preparedness advooate' beoame
synonymous and indistinguishable. One who
favored the Allied oause was a patriotio
Amerioan: one who favored the German side
-- nay, even one who sought to maintain
a neutral position-- was a 'hyphenated
Amerioan a dangerous alien, a spy. a
trai tor.' In its ory for inoreased armaments it olaimed to be 'the best peaoe
society in the United States. ln 2

The popularity of peace societies in this country in
1914 led many observers interested in that movement to believe
that the "Golden Age of Man" was just ahead. Michael Clune,
addressing the annual meeting of the New York Peaoe SOCiety in
May of that year, refleoted the spirit of optimism. "Ambition,lI

said he, "will never again drench a continent in blood. A higher
oivilization than warts is appearing.'i At the outbreak of the
European war, the American Peace SOCiety. through its president
1
Li t. Dig., LIV, laj (May 5, 1917) p. 1334.
2

Abram,

OPe

cit., p. 24.
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Senator Theodore E. Burton, and Arthur D. Call, the seoretary,
issued a staterrent to the people of the united States, deolaring tha. t oauses of the ooni lict to be military preparedness
in Europe, and asked oar oitizens to unite "in prayer and supplioation today and tomorrow, and •••• on eao:1 suoceeding day
1
until world peace is restored."
The first organized movement in Amerioa directed towards the oessation of hostilities was plaoed before the public
during the winter of 1915.

H~aded

by the

E~lishwoma.n,

Mrs.

Pethwiok LawrenoeJand assisted by the brillant Hungarian,
Rosika Sohwim.IIer, a crusade against "the common enemy of mankind" was preached th:oughout the

na~ion.

This movement inspir-

ed Jane Addams to found the Woman's Peace Party, dedicated to
2

urging the immediate discussion of reasonable peace terms.
The following spring Jane Addams led a large delegation to
The Hague hoping to found a women's world wide peace oonference
that would call the govemmen ts to the ir senses and end the
confliot. But as the golden stream of war orders spread through
our economy, such efforts by visionary females were regarded
wit~

an only more soornful amusement. The more sophistioated

peaoe movement was careful to avoid entanglement in anything
ao "impractioal," olinging to the more popular objeotive of
1

Ibid., p. 161.
2

MilliS,

OPe

clt., p. 125.
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j

..

'

organizing peace only after the current war had ended in viotory for the Allies. It was on June 17, 1916, that the League
to Enforce Peace, the flower of this altruistic agitation, was
fonnally launched at Philadelphia. Ex-President Taft was at
its head; Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell was chairman of its executive
committee; and many other eminent and high-minded men were
enlisted in its ranks. A powerful propaganda engine had been
created to add the military strength of the United States to
(.

the guarantee of a "permanent," peace system, once the Allies
1

should have safely destroyed "Prussian Militarism."
On December 4, 1915, the steamship Osoar II,ohartered by Henry Ford, sailed for Europe with 83 peace mission2

aries aboard to "get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas."
But too many important people had withdrawn from the vessel
and the entire attempt was a fiasco. Ford left the party at Oslo.
Nor waf, although a few die-hards moved on to Germany and Franoe
only to find their efforts useless.
The fight to force peace through negotiations was dying
a slow death in the struggle-against those who favored peace
after victory. Then on-the night of February 3, 1917, just three
days after the German note informing the world of unrestricted
submarine warfare, the pacifists made their last stand. William
Jennings Bryan, speak ing to a crowd of five thousand or more in
1

Millis,

0)2.

ci t., p. 198.

Halsey.

0)2 •

oi t., Vol. 10, p. 435.

2
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New York City, was cheered when he avowed that the United States
wo uld not "get down and wallow in the mire of human blood." Out
of this

me~tinglthe

Emergency 1:'eace Federation, sponsored by

several peace organizations,toOk form. In the next three months
it raised over

~76,OOO

Peace Federation

for its work. In Washington, an Emergency

Committee~was

formed, while in Chicago, long

an active peace center llIlder the insp;iration of Jane Addams
and Louis p.

Loch~er,

the pacifists began to take steps

cal~

c ala ted to prevent our involv.ement
in war. On February 12, a
,
large delegation of pacifists encamped a t

~vashington.

Meetings

were staged and conferences with Congressmen held. David Lawrence
wrote to the New York Evening Post; "Somehow, the pacifists
got a better recepti on than the ir most enthusiastic followers
1

have believed was possible in the national capital."
Early the next month Jane Addams visited President
Wilson and told of her reception:
"He still spoke to IlS as to fellow
pacifists to whom he was forced to confess
that war had become inevitable. He said
that as head of a great nation participating in the war, he would have a seat in
the peace conference, but that if he remained the representative of a neutral
country he could at best be on call through
a crack in the door. It was as if his
heart's desire spoke through his words
and -dictated his view of the situation." 2
Certain pacifist groups, notably the flying squadron of
speakers led by Chancellor-Emeritus DaVid Starr Jordan of Stan(ord
1

Abrams, op. cit., p. 44.
2

,

Swain, Joseph Ward: Beginning the fwentieth ventury, pp. 498-499.

\

\

,

'
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/

Universi ty, continued their energetic but futile efforts to stem
1

the tide of war •
.As the country edged closer to the brink: of war com-

plaints began to pour in from t he more radically-minded members
of the peace societies, ciaiming that the organizations were
"side-stepping and watahfully waiting," and were "parties to a
aonspiraay of silenae."

As if to substantiate these alaims,

various branches of the Society told of blacksliding members.
The Pres ident of the Derry Pe.aae Society in New Hampshire aomplained because the leading members of the state organization
"had joined the great preparedness army just now sweeping the
aountry." On the eve of our declaration of war, the Society
stated the rather obvious fact that the decision to enter or
refrain from entering the war had "to be made by the United
States government,

II

since the American Peace Soaiety could not

"deaide the question. n On the last day of Marah, 1917, the
Springfield Repub1iaan (Mass.) had already aongratu1ated the
2

organization on being suah a "good loser."
Another group that must be taken into consideration
I '

was the Socialist Party, the avowed party of pacifism. Meeting
in Convention at St. LOUis, in 1917, the party dea1ared the
struggle a aapitalist war and promised opposition to its proiJecution. a step which led to the eventual arrest of many
Socialist leaders, among them Eugene V. Debs, frequently the
1

Mock, James R. and Larson, Cedria: Words that Won the War, p. 26.
2

AbrallB, Ope ait., p. 161.
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1

Sooialist party's oandidate" for president.

The great wartime

sohism in the ranks of the Sooialists did not ooour Ilntil the
middle of April, 1917, bllt throughollt Maroh the press had oarried stories

reporti~

the oonversion of iniividllal Sooialists

who had previous ly opposed entranoe int 0 what they regarded
as an imperialist war. Those who left the fold did so on the
belie f that the war was a war against all tooraoy.
The basio reason for the trend of the Amerioan ohurohes
from peaoe, to preparedness, :to war, is apparent. IJhristians and
Jews have simplY'llsed the Bible to aid in rationalizing any
praotioe or idea whioh they were oarrying out and believed to be
just ified. It is th us a oommonplaoe that the Bible has been quoted
to justify nearly every praotioe and belief know to man; war and
peaoe, slavery and anti-slavery, ohild labor, polygamy and monogamy, oelibaoy, the burning of witohes and the torture of heretios, oapi tal punishment, women sllffrage, oommunism, oapitalism,
the oharging of interest, temperanoe and absolute prohibition,
faith healing and eto. And finally the love of oountry exoeeds
the love

I .

of mankind. Priests and ministers oalled eaoh other
2
names and aooused one another of worshipping false gods. It beoame a "Holy War." Another Tital relationship is that Which
exists between the religion of Christianity and the religion of
Nationalism. The ohurohes were oonsistent in the reoord of
sllpporting all poplllar wars and proved, wha.t had long been sus1

Amerioan Labor Year Book.

19l7-19l8~

2

Abrams, OPe cit., p. 252.
,'.
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pp. 373-379.

petCted, that Christianity has been becoming

in~reasingly nation-

alist iC, while the god of Na ti onalism is more powerful in his
ability to command obedience and dev~tion unto death than is
Jehovah himself. Natioralian reached its highest development
during the First World War. There were thous,ands of appropriate
places of Christian worship, as in the First Baptist uhurch 0"£
New London, Conn., far example, the pastor, a chaplain during
the war, preached in his uhiform with a machine gun and an
1

American flag on the platforItl beside him.
The conception of war as inevitable and as salutary
under certain conditions is held by many conservative theologians.
They do not regard it as having a place in the ideal order but
regard it as a necessary eVil. A still more serious consequence
of a literal interpretation of Jesus' teaching concerning nonresistance is its bearing on the state. Its primary purpose is
to defend itself and its ci tizens from unjust attack. This is
the functi on of the army and the police • Without such use of
force the state would disintegrate and there would be anarchY..
The attempt is often mde to draw a fundaIllental moral distinction
between an army.and a police force. Hut in theory there is no
essential difference. Indeed, anyone who believes in the state
and understands what this. means must also believe that under
1

Abrams, op. cit., p. G45.
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"
1

certain cirs umstances war is morally justifiable.
The steady st'ream of atrocity

stories~

the suppress-

ing of all evidences of better feeling on the part of any section of the Gennan people, the disheartening effects of the
pron~ciamento

of the German intellectuals, the honest and

sincere revulsion of feeling against a nation that action of
whose leaders had plunged mankind into these unspeakable horrors-all worked to make righteous anger seem a vhristian duty. The
fact remains that in the heat,of
. the struggle the judgment of
'

many a minister did not conspicuously rise above that of the

2

average citizen.

.
The members of the cloth and their followers

were susceptible to war psychology and crowd-thinking in the
same manner as were the othe r ci ti zens. 'l'hey possessed no pro3

phylacti c agains t the mob mind.
In the first of the World Wars organized Uhristianity
tended in general to endorse the ca use of the Allie s agains t the
Central J:lowers, although favoring neutrality, and later supported
the participation of the Uni!ed

States~

in a war which they had

come to regard as righteous.
..()-

1

Knuds on, Albert B.: The Princ iDle s

0

f Christi an Et higs, p. 225.

2

Brown, William Adams: The Church in America, p. 97.
3

Abrams,

OPe

cit., p. 246.

4

Latourette, Kenneth Scott: A History of the Expansion of
Christianity, Vol. VII, Advanae 'l'hroggh the Storm, p. 148.
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V. THE REACTION uF BUSINESS AND LABOR.

Hnsiness is a oombination
of war and sport.
Andre Ma uro is

/
The moo t aonvenient alassifiaation ot the prinaipal
aauses of wars as we see them to have arisen in history is;
religous, po,litiaal a.nd eaonomia. 'l'he latter two, espeaia.lly,
are intertwined beyond the hope ot disentanglement.

1

The story of Ameriaan politiaal involvement as a result
of eaonomia pressures is easily followed by a series of sucaessive steps. First, a policy of striat neutrality was fOllowed. fhen
the permitting of private loans to belligerent nati.ons followed.
Third was the period of armed neutrality and then war itself.
It must be remembeted that Britis# trade restriations
were not devised for the purpose of drawing the United States into
war. The primary object wa's to injure the enemies of Great Britain
by every means legal and illegal. It sought1aooording to Winston
Churohill, to treat, "the whole of

~ermany

as if it were a be-

1eaguered fortress, and avowedly sought to starve the whole population-- men, women, and ohildren, old and young, wounded and
2

sound, into submission."

The British government at the outset of

the war realized that Amerioan economio assistanoe would be needed
to bring the struggle in Europe to a s uaaessful oonol usi on, but
only gradually did they realize the extent of their dependenoe on
';i;
.....

.

the Arm rioan e oonomy.
1

Salter, Sir Arthur; Thomson, Sir. J. Arthur} Johnston, G. A.;
Zimmern, Alfred; Andrews, C. F.; Libby, Frederiok J.; Atkinson,
Henry A.; Steed, Wiokham and others: The Causes of War, (Salter.
The Eoonomio Cagses of War,) pp. 15-16.
2

Peterson, Ope oit., pp. 82-83.
3

Ibid" p. 71.
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From almost the first, British naval power and poliOW
made Amerioan foreign trade dependent upon the aotions of the
British government. It also oaused the

~ermans

to retaliate and

thus oome in oonflict with the Amerioan government. Later. large
munitions oontracts in this oountry meant high wages and higher
profits for thousands of people in .amerioan industry. The next
aot was loans to Britain. These gave some Amerioans a vested interest in the Allied oause. All three oombined to oreate good
will between the United State,s and lireat Britain and, indirectly,
to oreate ill-will between the United States and Gerrrany. :ii:aoh
1

step was propaganda in the most praotioal sense of the word.
The Amerioan policy at the outbreak of the war was in
strict aooord with the rules of international law, which states,
"Neutrals may legitirrately carryon all sorts of trade, and bel2

ligerents may interr upt all. If

Thus Britain, contrOlling the sur-

faoe of the seas I was able to halt

~er ioan

trade to the c ont inent

without destruction of American lives and shipping, and

German~

forced to: retaliate with her only weapon, the submarine. found
herself alienating the Amerioan public. 1'he aspects of the eoonomio warfare as oarried on by Great Britain, although fully within
the bounds of international law, was desoribed by many in the war1

Peterson, Ope oi t., p. 71.

2

Woolsey, Theodore D.: Introduction to the Study of International
ChP~. 2, ~eo. 184, par. 3, p. 309.

Law,
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time phrase,

If

Grea t Bri tain rule s the waves and waives the r ules ~ n

1

Representative Towner of Iowa was one of the few who looked into
the future and· forsaw the danger. As early as AUgust 28, 1914,
he sp oke agains tour b usi ne ss poli cy on the floor of Congress. fo
ship food and clothing to the Allies, he warned his countrymen,
was to aid them in their struggle wi th Gennany and Austria. "At
best we would be fort una te if we co uld avoid being drawn into the
war;" but to en 00 urage even commercial e:xp arts toone s ide, when
the other was debarred from our uar"cets, would be "to invi te our
2

own entanglement."
Towner took the position of Secretary of State Bryan
who believed that if we are neutral ~ a 11 belligerents should re.
ceive exactly the same treatment at our hands, [EhiS 'liQuId .nvolve
strict prohibition of all trade and relations wi th all mtions as

,

reselling of our material by another neutral m tion might .nvolve

us]

even though this would involve the government

in~a new inter-

pretation of international and united States law, as we were at
3

the time functioning under previously agreed upon rules.

The Pres-

ident took the stand that rules could not be changed for the advantage of one c ont estant ·while the struggle was on, and set his face
1

Peterson, OPe Cit., p. 770
2

Millis, Ope Cit., p. 99.
3

Bryan, William Jennirgs and Mary Baird: The Memoirs of William
Jennings Br¥an, p. 395.
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resolutely aga1re t any acti on which would be clearly a violation
1

of American ne utrali tY.
Our growing trade with England had its repercussions
in

~ermany,

and Mr. Gerard, our

ambassad~

in Berlin)repprted that

Umy job is nade mrder by these sales of munitions"; a growing

bitterness toward the United States was not difficult to detect
2

in the Central Powers.
If he could not stop the trading now going on wi th warring nations, then he might

~top

the possibility of any loans to

these nations, was the attitude of Secretary Bryan. In a letter
to the President, August 10, 1914, Bryan wrote:
"Money is the worst of all
contraband because it commands everything else.... If we approved of s nch
loans •••• Otlr ci ti zens wo uld be di vided
into groups, each group loaning money
to-the country which it favors and this
money could not be furnished wi thout
expressions of sympathy •••• The powerful financial interests which would be
oonnected with these loans would be
tempted to support the int erests of the
government to whioh they loaned." 3
Once again Secretary Bryan was attempting to lead the
government into making its own international law, for international
law does not require of the ne utral sovereign that he shOuld keep
the oitizen or subjeot within the same strict lines of aeutrality
1

Bak er. op. ci t ., Vol. 5, p. 1280
2

Millis, Ope c1 t., p. 101.
3

Peterson, OPe oit., p. 86.
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whioh he is bound to maintain for himself. "The private person,
if the law of his own 'state or some speoial treaty does not forbid, oan lend money to the enemy of a state at peaoe with his own
oountry for purposes of war, or oan enter into its servioes as a
soldier, wi thout involving the

governlJ~nt

1

of his oountry in guilt."

The edi tor of the Springfield RepubliC!an knew his law:
"That our government is rraking
the international law of the future by
its disapproval of loans to na. ti ons at
war is the opinion of the Springfield
Rep ublioan. whioh :r:eminds us tba t the
presen t law does not forb id loans of
money to a belligerent state by private
oitizens of neutral states." 2
On August 16, 1914 the announoement of the President's
polioy, in regard to loans to a nation at war, was

telegra~)hed

to J. P. Morgan and Company.
"There is no reason why lo~ns
should not be made to the governments
of neutral na.tions, but in the judgement of this goverThoont, loans by
Amerioan bankers to any foreign government whioh is at war are inoonsistent
with the true spirit of neutrality." 3

,

,

.

,

In oonsequenoe of this announoement no loans were made
at that time.
But on Ootober 23, a teohnioal distinotion between loans
1

Woolsey, op.oit., Chpt. 2, ;;)eo. 173, p. 290.
2

Lit. Dig., XLIX, 10 (Se~t. 6. 1914) p. 404.

3

Bake r, op.

0

it., V0 m• 6 , p • 176 •
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i

and bank oredits was made

followi~

adviae to the President by

Robert Lansing, advisor to the State Departrmnt.

,

" •••• Sinoe the beginning 0 f the
war. I an informed that one bank alone
has reoeived oabled instruotions for the
P8¥ment of more than $50,000,000 for
Ame ri<lan go ods and that the vo lume of
this bus ina ss is inc reasi ng. Owing to
war oonditions, this buying is neoessarily for <lash and it is of suob magnitude that the <lash oredits of the
European governments are being fast depleted. Lately it has been urged by
oertain manufaoturers and by representat i ,~es of s orne of the foreign governments, that the baTIks should provide
temporary oredits for these purohases
••••
n •••• the oritioal time for
AIle rioan finanoe in our int erm tional
relations is during the next three or
four months and, if we allow these purchases to go elseWhere, we will have
negleoted our fo reigh trade at the time
of our greatest need and greatest opportunity ••••
"For the purpose of enabling
European governments to make oash payments, it is suggested to grant to them
short time banking oredits, to both
belligerent and neutral governments,
and when neoessary or desirable replenish their oash balanoes on this
s ide by the purohase of short time
Treas ury warrant.s." 1

.

With Allied credits established, the "opportunity" for
inoreasing our foreign trade that
in coming.

~rade

Mr.

Lansing stated, was not long

with the Allied oountries inoreased approximately

141 peroent from 1914 to 1915. After 1915 the outstanding indebtedness of the Allies in the united States was inoreasing by leaps
1

Baker,

Ope

oit., Vol. 5, p. 186 •
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I

and bounds. 'l'he New York press, wi th the notable exception of the
Hearst and the

German-la~uage

papers, gave the loan stalwart

1

support.
The general sentiment of the mtion for the rerminder of
the year seemed to be peace and prosperity Vlhich the New :lork l'imes
summed up in a New Years Day, 1915, editorial:
" • • •• The promise 0 f the new year
is that we shall accomplish a peaceful
penetration of the world r s markets to an
extent we have IE ver dreamed of. What
others have shed blood to obtain through
politics and force ,we shall attain while
bestowing our benevolence.
" •••• It is a mew translation of
the old beatitude, revised; 'Blessed are
the l.:e epers of the peace for pros peritY2
shall be wit hin the ir home s and palaces. I if
The Times was wrong. Prosperity did come, but not through
peace. Uredits to the British government created prosperity for
the American blJ.si!l..essman, farmer and worker and edi torial pages
were reflecting the general trend of good times. The New York
.American called the surge of prosperity "our financial emancipation
3

from t he European struggle."

But few looked far enough ahead to

realize what WOuld happen to the American prosperity bubble when the
credits ran out. These credits by banks hampered the Federal Reserve
System but bond loans, if permitted, would remove the problem. Mor1

Peterson, OR. cit., pp. 92, 103.
2

Lit. Dig., L, 2 (Jan. 9, 1915) p. 39 0

3

Ib id" 16 (Apri 1 17, 1915) p. 859.
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gan once again requested a rulirg from the President on the feasibility of loans and this time Lansing answered via memorandum
stating that such loans were permissible as the re was a difference
between the "true spirit of neutrality" and "strict legality." There
is no record of a written discussion by the President and his ad ..
1
visors but the situation was discussed.
The l!organ- Company si gned aco ntract wi t h the Lieading

Commission on Septeober 25, 1915. The loan was for

~500,000,000

and it was issued with a two per cent "spread" through a

s~n~icate

of sixty-one New YorK Houses with 1,500 members throughout the
country, and hence to thousands of individual investors. Chicago,
the financial cap'ital of the liliddle West with a considerable
Gennan population, remained cool. The only serious attack upon
the loan,

however~

was on grounds, not of national policy, but of

financial safety. This was met by the argument that the Allies
did not really need money but only foreign exchange. This same
argument was used to put pressure on the government. When on
October 14, the books were closed, the somewhat ticlr.lis1Jl si tuation
2

had proved a success.

Spring Rice, the British ambassador, stated

in one of his reports\.' concerning the loan: "When it became apparent that a loan was necessary in order to give credit for American
1

Baker, OPe Cit., Vol. 4, p. 187.
2

Millis, Ope Cit., p. 221.

-109-

"
exports to Europe, many secret forces began to act in its favor.
The Government itself undoubtedly wished it, mainly because a conI
tinuance of .American trade depended upon a credi t."
Soon Arrer.ican ships were carrying practically nothing
bllt British supplies. Jjusiness with the Allied powers grew by
leaps and bounds, wi th but onecloud on the horizon; the war might
end.

~very

time there was talk of peace, munitions stocks went

down from five to 40 per cent. war had brought us prosperity,
peace threatened to bring cal,amity. Gradually other worries began

.

to trouble American industry and finance. Suppose the Germans won-what then? "No, that could never happen. We have the mrd of A.D.
Moyes, financial editor of the New York

~imes,

that Wall Street

pioked the Allies to Win at the very start and never wavered in
2

this firm bel ief."
The stock market reports throughout 1916 reveal strikingly
the close economic relationship between the United States and the
Allies. The news of the

~erman

victory at Jutland caused a big

drop in the mr.tCet while the exploits of the U-53 (submarine)
created a temporary panic in which $500,000,000 was lost in 15
minutes. Early in December the New

Yo~'k

Times recorded that the

Gennan peace offer had sent all stocks down. The next day prices
1

MilliS, .op. cit., p. 220.
2

Engelbrecht, H. D. and Hanighen, F. C.: Merchants of Death,
pp. 174-175.
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r"'rooe because there was no fear of "peace." At the time of the
Wilson peace offer, the TiIhes stated: "Sales of more than 300.000
1

shares force most violent slump known in fifteen years."

Bant~

credits were sharply curtailed, and the Allied governments were
able to renew the ir bi lIs wi t h the most extreme di fficul ty. The
news of the d iploIm t ia break wi th Germany on t he 4th of February,
1917,

se~

Bethlehem citee1 up 30 points. Mr. Henry p. DaVidson,

a partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, bad been one of the mos t
active opponents of

~ermany'~,

"insincere" peace offers; he had

wished for American particUpation in the war in order to "cleanse
·2

us from our self-righteousness. n
The ootton market also followed the stock rmrket in the
fear that war might end. By January, 1915, the price of cotton
began gradually to rise, and continued until the fall of 1916,
when the German peace proposal caused uncertainty again. On February 3, the day after diplolilatic relations with Germany were
severed, the price began to rise sharply and the advance continued until the spring of 1918, when government price regulations
were threatened and later inaugurated.

Fo~

the greater part of

the peri od from July 27. 1914 to Febrnary 3, 1917, prices were
3

belOW the 1913 average.
1

Peterson, OPe cit., p. 267.
2

Lasswe 11, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
3

Baruch, Bernard M.: Am::lrican Industry in the War, p. 245.
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Thus Amerioa was lending herself prosperity; a prosperity which in the end many eoonomists believe can be nothing but
false enoomy and wi th the moo t dangerous fOnD of lendi ng money
known to financiers; the lending of money by private individuals
to a foreign nation. llhe loan

may~e

considered purely a pri vate

transaction, without political considerations, but wnen default
occurs, it may result in governmental action. An important source
of friction in international relations arises from the use of
1

the diplomatic maohine to assist nations in collecting debts.
The September issue of Lalollette's Magazine (published
and edited by Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Wisconsin) carried
a caustic editorial:
nWi th the fi rst clash of the
great European war came President Wilson's solemn appeal •••• 'The Uhited States
must be neutral in fact as well as in
name' •••• But when you can boom stocks
600 per cent in nanufacturing munitions
-- to the Bottomless Eit with neutrality!
What do Morgan and Schwab care for world
peace men there are big profits in world
war? ••• The stocks of the Schwab properti es which stood at a marl~et value of
seven millions before they began supplying
the allies •••• are today given an aggregate 'value' of forty-nine millions. And
now.we are about to engage in furnishing
the .illlies funds •••• We are underwriting
the success of the cause of the Allies.
We have ceased to be 'neutral in fact as
well as in name.,n 2
1

Salter, OPe cit., p. 17.
2

MilliS, Ope 01 t., p. 218.
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The last statement was probably true for a considerable
number of Amerioans. 1'hrollghout the summer prosperity bad been
rising in an ever dizzier ourve; by September the steel trade
had "never seen demand so overwhelming and at the same times its
output expanding on such a soale under steadily rising prioes",
,

by Ootober the railway terminals, both east and west) were beginning to break down under a greater jam of traffio than had been
1

witnessed in the most prosperous years of the past.
Not until the

olos~llg

days of 1914, and not strongly

until the follpwing spring was the suggestion pushed that the
United States by a threat of embargo on war materials might
foroe the Bri t ish to abandon those drastio interfere noes wi th
ne utra1 trade whioh were illegal in the eyes of the .Arre r ioan government. Apparently

w~

did not recognize the international sig-

nifioanoe of our immense eoonomio power, and we probably oould
not have used it, if we had, since embargoes would have resulted
in an eoonomio shook that Amerioan business was unprepared to
withstand either by knowledge, or vision, or fortitude. 110reover,
in the hope that the war would soon end-- or yield to the President's efforts to bring about peaoe-- there always lurked an
exouse for avoiding drastio measures. Thus by the end of the
year 1914 thetraffio in war materials with the Allies had beoome
deeply entrenohed in Amerioa's eoonomio organization, and the
1

Millis, Ope cit., p. 218.
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possibility of keeping out of the war by the diplomacy of neu1
trality, was greatly reduced.
Despite the financial backing and the steady stream of
war materials flowing to the Allies. the amount of American materials reaching the

~erman

army through neutral European nations

enraged the British. Lfermany had been aut off from the direct
purchase of .8merican goods by the British Navy, but a trickle
of supplies cant inued to reach them. These goods were furnished
by European neutrals by one o.f two methods; first, the direct reexportation of mterials imported from abroad which formed a
considerable volume of the trade of Germany and the neutrals
and which had by no means ceased. 'l'he second form was the export
of domestic products and the filling of the deficit by importation from abroad, mainly from the united States, d.esuite the fact
that they bad promised that no material imported from America
2

would be exported to Germany.
The British answer to this situation was the contraband list; a long list of materials which might be used in furyW4.ing German war

aims~

were not to be shipped by American mer-

chants to European neutrals. This seemed a bold stroke but when
one is involved in making war, any action to further ~,~ own
aims is considered justifiable. With the list came a warning
1

Baker, Ope cit., Vol. 5, p. 181.
2

Clark, J. Maurice: Hamilton, Walton. H.; and Moulton, Harold G.:
Readings in the Economics of War, p. 285 (adapted from, Moore,
Janes Loui8, The New York Times, August 19, 1917).

\ I
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I
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from the British that all mercba.nt ships going to Europe would
be seized and searched and oontraband would be

tai~en

over and

fair remuneration given. Dut still Britian hid to be careful not
to anta.gonize amerioa too far. Perhaps nothing in the early
days of the war enraged the .dritish military chiefs more than
the fact that cotton was permitted to go from the United States
to Germany. Tba t Germany was using this cot ton in the man ufacture of torpedoes to sink British ships and projectiles to kill
British soldeirs in trenches.was well known; nor did many people
deny that Great Britian had the right to put cotton on the contraband list. Yet, Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister, in
end~

the pursuit of his larger

refused to take this step. He

knew that the prosperi ty of the ;.3outhern states depended exolusively upon tne cotton crop. He also knew that the South had
raised the 1914 crop with no knowledge that a war was impending
and that to deny the southern planters their usual access to the
Gerrmn maricets would all but ruin them. He believed that such a
ruling would immediately alienate the sympathy of a large section
of the United Stat es and

m~ce

our southern Senators and Congress ...

men enemies of Great Britian. For this reason he did not declare
1

cotton contraband until August 20, 19l5.11he South was immediately alarmed, one reason being the 1914 crop-- 2,000,000 more bales
2

than usual.

Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo met the situation

1

Hend rick, Burton J.: The Li fe and Let ters of walt er H. Page,
Vol. 1, p. 367.
2

Baruch, OPe cit., p. 245.

)I
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by iss uing a statement to the press to the effect that the Treasur y would de posi t, if its ho

4-

be come ne cessary, $30,000.000

or more in Southern Federal Reserve Banks far- loans on cotton
1
warehouse certificates (August 23, 1915).
It appeared as if relati ons between the Uni ted Stat es
and Great Dritian might become strained on the qrestion of neutral
2

trade and the exanunation of the mails.

Even the cartoonists were

beginning to sharpen their pene ils wi th anew. tho ugh sti 11 friend ...
ly asperitY,and John Bull's r.otund form began to appear in our
papers, often with a string of stolen

~~rican

cargoes under his

arm, in attitudes less than, m roic. "Thousands of American importers," as Mr. Lansing wrote Mr. Page, were clamoring to the State
Departmen~

against the British stoppage of cargoes from Germany.

They were threatening to hold uass meetings to "denounce the dictatorial and illegal policy of Great Britian toward the United
States" and lobbying for an export embargo as long as Great Bri3

tain continued to treat them "with contumely and contempt."
On

Dece~ber

med that there

w~s

3, 1914, Ambassador Page was bluntly infor-

"sharp cri ticisn in this co untry" of Bri tish

high-handedness, and that sone thing wo uld have to be done. This
new stiffness at last appears to have prodded Page into some realization of the true position and he replied on December 7, with
I

Baker,

Ope

cit., Vol. 5, p. 378.

2

Allen, George H. and others: The Great War, Vol. 4, pp. 374-375.
3

Millis,

OPe

cit., p. 222.
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1

a proposed "working arrangement" with Great

Brit~in.

The press

of the na tion was also split on the quest ion of wha t to do. The
New Yorker Herold (German language) labeled our unrestricted
trade with the Allies "dollar diplomacylT and added that "all the
powder and gun factories of the entire lam are working at breakneck sPied, b'or whom? ••• "They requested that all readers write
to their representatives to force the government (to act) ani
hinted that "American arIIE-manufacturers don't care now whether
there's a revolution in Mexicp or not. n

2

But the mjority' of the

Arne ri can pr ess backed the PreSident for his stand and the New York
Morning '.l'elegraph commented that it was the "frank belief of many
along shore that the British admiralty, under the guise of guarding British interests is making an extension of American ocean
3
trade as difficult as possible."
As the full effect of the British stand became apparent

to the .A.m3rican public the Literary Digest reported that "our
press as a whole is by no means willing to accept Sir Edward
Grey's statement of fact at its face value or to consider his arg uments concll1s ive. IT The vvashington Pes t was very indignant.

n

Just

as Germany destroyed Belgium on the plea of military necessity,
England proposes to destroy American commerce.· i .A. few of the press,
mostly from the pro-British section of the nation, could see a
1

Ibid. p. 119.
2 .
)
Li t •. Dig., L, 1 ( Jan. 2,· 1915) pp. 3, 8.
3

Ibig.,)2 (Jan. 9, 1915) p. 38.

/
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silver lining in Grey's reply and hinted to the; publia that "the
note gives promise of an early and sat is faat ory understanding."
Only two members of the fo urth estate, the New Haven Journal-Courier
,
1
and the '{iall Street Journal believed the answer satisfaatory.
At both ends of the Atlantia passage" .Ameriaan trade
wit h the Central Powers was sub,j eat before the end of 1914 to a
"volunt!3-r.v system" of British supervision as astonishing in its
extent as it was probably abhorrent both to domestia, and international law. "One hesitates ,to think of the storm of popular
outrage which would have resulted had the
tion to exert one tenth

0

~ermans

been in a posi-

f the interference whiah was soaraely
2

notiaed when practiaed by the Allies."
But the possibility of an, outbreak with Great Britain
due to the hampering of our commercial relations with the Central
,owers was averted-- not by a relaxing of British restrictions or
a change of heart of the American public and government-- but by
the short-sightedness of

Ger~any.

For on February 5, 1915, the

newspapers of the United States were blazing with the headline:
Gerrranv Proalaims a War Zone • .At the orecise moment when .American
resentment against the'British trade controls might conceivably
have produced some tangible results the

~ermans

had created a di-

version in whiah all t_,-ought of the trade aontroversy wa.ssoon to
3

be swallowed up and-lost.
1

Ibid. 4 (Jan. 23, 1915) pp. 131, 132, 133.
2
'
Millis, , op. ci t., p. 114.
3
Ibid~

p. 134.
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'.rhe British overlooked nothing in an attempt to bring
Ameri oan industria 1 might behind them. At the annual

0

onvent ion

of' the Amerioan Federation of Labor in the fall of 1914, the regularly' aooredited delegates from the

~ritish

frades Union Congress,

who usw.lly oame, were missing; in their stead, however, there
turned up "two Bri tish labor men," Mr. James Seddon and Mr. Albert
Bellamy, who were eagerly reoeived and questioned about the war
1

by the knerioan labor ohieftains."

Whether the British labor rep-

resentatives tipped the balance or oompletely ohanged the opinions
of Amerioan Labor leaders is unoertain, but at least the results
were the same.

Many of the labor groups, whioh were eyed with sus-

picion beoause of their supposed disinclination to proseoute the
"Capitalists I war," as agi tators oalled it, were similarly eager
to display their patriotism. When a big munitions strike broke out
in the bridgeport faotories, in 1915, Samuel Gompers, head of the
An18rioan Federation of Labor} rushed off at onoe to stop it and so

.

2

"protect the good name and safety of the labor movement."
Wi th the break off of d iplona t io rela ti ons fo llowing the
unrestricted submarine warfare note, February 3, 1917, ,:Mr. Gompers
oabl ed Carl Leg ien, the presi dent of the lierrmn frades· Union Fedoration, demanding tr..at he put pressure on hiS government to halt
submarine warfare; and when the lierman presently responded with
1

Ibid., p. 650
2

Ibid.,

p.

206.
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the suggestion that Mr. Gompers put pressure on England to raise
the food blockade. the great Arre ri can labor leader felt that
1

Leigen's answer was a patent "evasion of duty."

The four Railroad

Brotherhoods announced on lfurch 10, 1917 that their threatened
2

strike would be called off in the event of war

and there were

some lOngShoremen(and munition wori.:.er's strL.:::es of considerable
proportions; but it seems rather doubtful that labor's National
3

Peace Council could rightly claim credit for them.

.

The huge volume of ,business enjoyed by the United States
during the last year of neutrality helpsto explain why no military
action or economic sanctions were taken against Great Britain for
her contraband list and her censoring of mail. Exports jumped from
Over two and one-half million dollars to four and one-third bill4
ion. The war economics as a vmole made the United States a financial. if not a political. ally of Great Britain and l!'rance • .As
soon as the liermans struck back at the blockade and the utilization of the New 1;'lorld as a ba,se of SU91,lie:3. they found themselves
confronted not only by the might of Great Britian and her allies,
but also by that of the united States. As far as the economic warfare was concerned. the alerican dechrati on of war took place in
5
1915.
1

Ibid,. p. 389.
2

Mock and Larson, OPe Cit •• p. 26.
3

Millis, o~. cit., p. 206.
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Peterson, OPe cit., p. 256.
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~,Yar

costs money, and the expense falls by no means

wholly on the belligerents. If the European conflict bro ught the
United States industrial prosperity, it also imposed-- even in the
ye~rs

of neutrality-- a heavy fiscal burden. On the one hand, the

army, the navy, the merohant mari ne and other services called for
increased outlays; on the other, diminished iJ,jports cut off customs receipts, with 1915 being the smallest year since 1899, but
thereafter unt il shortly a fter the
1
revenue showed a steady incr~ase.

c~

os e of the war go vernmen tal

Each time that the berlin Government made a concess ion
to the United States, such as warning before sinking, it expected
that Washington would foroe corresponding concessions from the
Allies. but the united States possessed no means of bringing effeotive pressure to bear upon the Allies without injuring so deeply
2

its own commercial interest that the price seemed too high to pay.
As was explained by Secretary Lansing, in his reply to the Austrian
protest. August 12, 1915, the United States, accustomed to rely on
small defensive for ces and on t he right and power to pur chase arms
a:ld ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack, was
the last nation in the'world that could afford to establish a pre3

cedent of the kind that was asked.
1

Ogg,

Ope

cit., Vol. 27, p. 351.

2

Seymour, .itm. Dip., p. 130
3

Ogg, Ope oit., Vol. 27, p. 332.
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Most of the restrictions that appeared likely to touch
American interests were gradually arranged by private negotiations.
Certainly oommerce and trade were

De

ver more profi.table f or Amer-

icans. The Allied command of the sea, on the whole. was not exercised in a way seriously to in,iure .Arrerioan pookets, but it did
1

injure Amerioan pride.
'rhe deolaration of the unrestricted s Ilbrrarine warfare
in January, 1917, proved the straw that broke the baok of Amerioan
ne utrali ty.
Business interests were bound up with the maintenanoe of
foreign trade which was controlled by the Allies. But this fact
by no means justifies the belief that those interests forced the
United States int 0 the war. From the economio point of view oontinued neutrality was for them the most desirable goal, just as
for Wilson it was the main polit ical purpose. If condi ti ons of
nelltrali ty had remained bearable there would have been no inter2

venti on.
-0 ...

1

Seymour, Am. Dip., p. 44.
2
Ibid. pp. 24-25.
I
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~/

VI. COnCLUSION.

'ilar is not "inevi tab Ie t "
but proceeds from definite and
removable causes.

G. Lowes Dickinson

At the onset of the European struggle the fact was clear
that the american people would find it more than ordinairily difficult to avoid taking sides as this was a ':Vorld War; and theUnited States, the historic asylum of the oppressed. contained a "menagerie of nationalities,"l But this did not mean that the American"
people wanted to get into the fight, nor did it mean that they now
loved Great Britain • .Although the Ill3.jority of those who took sides
seem to have favored the .Allies, this feeling was probably more

,

2

anti-German than pro-British •.
The pop ula r Arne ri can cone ep t ion t hat ne ut rali ty is a
clearly defined stat us is erroneous. On the contrary, we shall
come closer to a correct view if we think of neutrality merely as
a policy, which, within certain limits, has an almost infinite
number of p~utations and conbinations. No two authorities can
agree on a definition of the precise rights and duties of neutrals,
except as regards specific and (for us) minor matters such as the'
withholding of direct aid by a neutral nation to a belligerent, or
the duty of a neutral government to refuse to allow its territory
to be used as a base for military operations against a belligerent.
The trade rights of a ne utral are as broad as the power the ne utral

1
Bailey, Thomas A.: A Diplomatic History of the American People,
p. 610.

2
Of the 367 editors who replied to a Lit. Dig. poll, 20 favored
the ~ermans, 105 the Allies, and 242 neutrality; XLIX, 20 (Nov.
14, 1914) p. 939.
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is willing and able to assert to maintain those rights. Neutrality
should IOOan that policy which a country at peace adopts toward
I

countries at war.
In the opening decade of the twentieth century, unbeknownst to many Ameri cans, the United Sta tes had become a wo rId
power. 1'he country's foreign trade had been growing by leaps and
bounds; by 1913 exports reached a value of nearly two and a half
billion d ollars.

~xports

whi ch bulked so large in the na ti onal

economy exercised, of course,. a corresponding important political
2
.
influence at Washington. There are many writers who attribute
America's entry into the war solely or largely to these financial
bonds by which she was bound to the Allies, ancl to the foreign
propaganda by which she was duped; but these forces must not be
over-emphas ized. Mos,t .Ameri cans favored the AlIi es be fore the war
orders arrived or the loans were floated, and the loans were as
much an expression of sympathy as a mere business transaction. In
1915 the Germans, too, tried to borrow in this country; but only

a few German-AIlE r:i cans lent, though the German armies were then
3

vi ctorious on every front.
Mr. Millis, in his interesting book, gives us the impression that the United States' was caught in the world war primarily
1

Dulles, allen W. and Annstrong, Hamilton Fish: Can We be Neutral?
p. 7.
2

Ibid., p. 20.
3

Swain,
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cit., p. 473.
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/

beoanse of the preponderanoe of British propaganda, the subleties
,

of British diplorraoy, and the influenoe of vested finanoi aI, oommeroial and industrial interests whose fortunes beoame tied up
with an Allied viotory. These faotors all oonnted. But to single
them out and stress thern so heavily seems to us to allow too little
for the m. tural predisposit ion of many .dmer toans fer oertain prinoiples and the ir an tipathy for oertain others. liTr. Millis tends to
igno 1'e the fundamental reasons wh:Ji Ameri can sentiment turned in
favor of the Allies ani again,st Germany. It is not necessary to
hunt for a demon either in Wall Street or in Downing Street to explain the An:erican attitude toward the war. Whatever may have been
the effect of hired propaganda or the influence of financial and
commeroial interests, they do not fully account for our interven1

tion.
1

Dulles and Armstrong, OPt oit., p. 22; Thus om looks in vain for
a reference to the faot that there was a treaty gual~9.nteeing .Belgium, that Germany had signed it, and that Gennany's viola ti on
of it exercised an instantan~tous and persistent effect on Amerioan
feeling toward Germany. The Belgian dep orta ti ons are oa lIe d nan
attack upon the unemployment problem in Belgirun and Northern
Franoe"; it is not mentioned that in 1917 Germany ordered the stoppage of all public works undertaken by the .3elgian oommunes and
provinces for the relief of nnemployment, that she had already removed to Gernany many 'of the instruments and rraobines of labor,
that the forced labor to Which the deportees were condemned was
work for the enemy, often on military roads and trenches, near the
front, that henoe the Belgians were Willing to suffer pnnis~~ent
and go into exile rather than work, and that many Americans pitied
and applauded them. When Mr. Millis describes the staff of the
Amerioan Legation in J.3russels and the American corre'pondents as
naive for not emphasizing that Belgian franos tireurs were teohnioally guilty of atrooities in sniping at the invading troops
and· that the German high oommand was teohnioally justified in
lining up local hos tages and shooti ng them, he mis ses the point;
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There oan be no doubt that there was muoh Allied propaganda; bllt there is considerable doubt as to its effect. It seems
reasonably olear that .American opinion was anti-German before the
war began; it also seems olear that Arrerican opinion was outraged
by the acts of Germany. Belgium was a fact; the Lusitania was a
fact • .and although

.d~i

ti sh propaganda unquest lorn. bly embellished

these facts, its effeot would have been incomparably weaker with1
out them.
We were unprepared as a people and as a government to
deal wi th the condi ti ons crea'ted by a genera 1 .c.;uropean war. There
was no time in the summer of 1914 to sit down quietly to weigh the
consequenoes of alternative courses to meet a situation which daily
became more complica.ted, mnch less to think out a

~ong-range

pol-

icy. All that our governinent could do was cling to the best precedents available, even though second thought might have raised
doubts as to whether they really were applioable to thA new conditions of ID9ritime warfare, especially when the war was being waged
by the mighty antagonists now

loc~:ed

in a death grip. vVe stu(}k to

no emphas is on the illegality of the Belgian ci vi lians action or
the legality of the German military reprisals would have male the
amerioan public of that day feel that the Belgian defenderz were
not acting heroica.lly and justifiably and that the German invaders were not acting in a contrary sense. Other oases could be
cited of failure to appreciate the origins of the sentiment whioh
as the war developed played an imp or tan t part in shap ing .Ameri oan
polioy. The hostile and criminal acts of ~erman agents in the
United States irritated the publio much more than Mr. Millis can
remember-- and were placed in a different category from the propaga.nda and publicity work of Allied writers and lecturers. It
seems to us unreal is tic to imagine that deep-rooted sentiment can
be dismissed as an im~ortant factor in determining the policies
of nations; perhaps, 1t is unjustified to assume that its elimination is necessarily desirable, even though one can prove in specifio cases it might well be.
1

Bailey, Ope cit., p. 613.
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the precedents; and they led us step by step rearer the arena.
What really

fr~ppened

was that from the very beginning of

the war American sympathies were engaged. On top of that, and of
decisive importance, the course which the Government took in denanding observance, of its tradi tional ne utral rights engaged the national honor of the United States in the defense of the principle
that its trade should continue and that its mtionals were entitled
to pr otecti on in the e xerci s e of that trade. When those right s were
curtailed by Great Britian,

~~

protested. 'Nhen our citizens who

were exerci sing those rights were killed by Gerlllany, when our ships
were sunk, and when Germany formally challenged our asserted rights,
then we went to war. If the basic conception of our policy was
sound, what other course in self-respect could we have followed?
Americans sometimes have vague preferences among foreign
conntries. Though some persons found deep reasons for these perferences, many who londly preferred one connt:cy to another based their
choice upon nothing more important than tradition, or the food and
treatment accorded to them in the hotels and trains of varions countries they had visited. England was the country tl1at loomed largest
in the Armrican mind, and aristocratic "Anglomaniacs" admired her
tremenduously; the common language and traditions, and the idea of
Anglo-Saxon solidari ty, impressed many; the English and Scotch immigrants in hIleri ca gen -rally retained a kindly feeling :';:'or the mother
country. But Englanl was also the mos t hated m ti on; many people
cons idered it a

DB

tter of patriotism to hate the forIjler mother coun-
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try-.. a sent.iment which the millions of Irish never allowed to grow
I

cold.
The German immigrants were equally well di sp osed towards
their former ]'a therl:and, while many intellectual leaders in America
had been trained in German universities, and admired Gernany's
achievements in science ani social reform.
Even the Irish did not curse the government from which
they fled more bitterly than did the Russian Jews in Aroorica. In the
days just before the war. nar:w Americans thought of France more favorably than in earlier years; but in regard to the other countries
2

of Europe people were ignorant and apa thet iC.
Sir Edward Grey knew his history:
"ReJa ti ons with the Unit ed States
differ from those of Great Britain with
any other country. The two countries have
one language in common, and the j urisprudence of both is founded upon the common law of England. The Armrican constitution was drawn up and made by men of
British race, whose descendants form a
large part of the present population of
the United States and are still proud
of their race and conscious of the kinship in blood and the common origin and
tradi ti ons. The whole people are attached
to democratic government and human freedom."
Sir Edward added, however:
"The sense of common race and or igin
is closely associated with the historical
memory of bitter war. ~rmricans do not always seem to realize that those who left
Britain to escape from King and prelates
1

Swain, Ope Cit., p. 474.
2

Loc. cit.
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were not the only British of the ir generations who loved liberty. Others stayed behind,
and in time there was established in Britain
a democracy as free as t hs" t founded in the
New Horld on the other side of the Atlantic.
Suocessi ve generations in .Bri tain have been
brought up to regard the separation of the
.american Colonie s as the wo rk of a m rrowminded King, v',/ho has b"een dead for a hundred years, and the outcome of a political
system that seems to us to-day as antiquated
and intolerable as it does to the people of
the Unit ed States. Hence, amongst ..lime ri cans
of Bri tis h st ock t here may be the histori cal
feeling of resentment, ·as well as the sense
of kinship." I
.
.
Hence, the pro-British sentiment had little effect on
pub lic opinion, however it may have influenced our statesmen as
the dilson administration showed pro-Ally leanings with the excepti on of t he Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who was cons idered by his co lleagues as pro-German. Wilson himself was of
British ancestry, and a strong admirer of British culture. He made
a genuine effort to pursue a strictly neutral course, but as the
war progressed he found his sympathies gravitating more and more to
the side of the Allies, and occasionally in private he would betray
2
himself. Once he burst out, "England is fighting our fight. 1I
Robert Lansing, who replaced Bryan as Secretary of State,
in his memorandum, "Consideration and Outline of Politics," written
I

Grey, Sir Edward: Twenty-five Years, VOl. 2, p. 86.
2
Bailey, OPe cit., p. 6140
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July 11, 1915, said:
"Ameriaan publia opinion mll..'3t be prepared fot the time, which may come, when
we will have to cast aside our neutrality
1
and become one of the champions of democracy. t1
pro~

Lansing also admits that he intenti onally he ld up and

longed the disputes to see if sorrethi.z:g could happen to change pub2

lic opinion before an answer had to be sent.
The ,President's mos t trusted advisor, Col. Edward M.

House, was strongly pro-ally. Ambassador Page in England was so
pro-British that instead of representing the United States in England, Page represented the British cause to the government in
3
Washington.
But these members of the administration were not the
nation, although holding positions which might influence the nation.
'The East was pro-Briti sh, the middle West
did not seem to care. Sensing the poli cy

De

0

utral and the far West

f the m ti on, Wilson on

August 4, when five nations had entered the struggle, issued a formal declaration of neutrality, Which was repeated as successive
states entered the contest; and two weeks later he made a special
appeal to his fellow citizens to be "neutral in fact as well as in
4

nan:e •••• vVe must be impartial in thought as well as in action."
1

War Memories of Robert Lansing, p. 21.
2

Ibid., p. 112.
3

Bailey, op.' cit., p. 620.
4

Ogg, OPe cit., Vol. 27, p. 329.
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With our neutrality proclaimed we started out with the
idea that there

mu.~t

be certain inherent rights of trade, a theSis

which we consistently mintained throughout our history. Like his
predecessors-- Washington, Adams, Jefferson and ila.dison-- President
Wilson was soon engaged in the effort to keep out of war, rraintain
neutrality, and at the saL16 time make good the illusive and inde'ini te d ootrine know as the Freedom of th e Seas. But now there
was no ser ious que sti on of embargoes or non-interco urse as in the
days of Jefferson; trade was:too important. When Congress met in
December 1914, bills were introduced to embargo the export of
arms and ammunition, one of them sponsored by an influential
Democrat, Senatoi' Hitchcock of Nebraska. The influences

\q~ich

pre-

vented its adopti on were not prLm r ily comrne rci '11. The b ill suffered
from being presented as a humanitarian measure rather than as a
move to keep us out of the war, and it was

atta~ked

and defeated

as preparing an "unneutral" change in our laws after a foreign conflict had begun. Nevertheless, the fact that our people had never
doubted their right and ability to continue trade with belligerents
and still remain neutral, and the fact that the relinquishment of
th9.t trade m uld have played havoc wi th rrany fundamental .Anierican
1

wi

occupat iOns, were ro ot caus es of Ollr whole a tti tude •
.<1.S

a legal basis foe the position we assumed,we first

tried to nake use of the Declaration of London of 1909, which defined contraband and etc., but we felt deprived of its real value
1

Dulles ani Armstrong,

OPe

ci t. , p. 24.
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due to the knowledge that Great Britain had never ratified the declaration and refused to apply it without modifications. f/ith this in
mind we fell back upon what we claimed to be the recognized rules
of int ernational law. But in doing so we had to recognize that inter·
DB. ti

om 1 law fai led to give us a definit e code ani that this fai II

ure would "undoubtedly be the soarce of numerous controversies."
Further. particula.rly in our dealings with the British, the doctrines.we had maintained in the Civil War aame in to plague us. We
had ourselves broo.dened the

i~ea

of "continuous voyage", the doc-

trine under whi ch we seized good s which were enro ute to a. ne ut ral
port but which we asserted had an ultirrate enemy destination; and
we bad extended the list of contraband.
Our m'os t serious admissi on was the cable from Secretary
Br~an

to Ambassador Page, December 26, 1914. " •••• that the commerce

betwen countries which are not belligerents should not be interfered with by those at war unless such interference is manifestly
an imperative necessity to protect their national safety, and then
2

only to the extent the. t it is a necess i ty. 11
Three imp or tant pr oblerns faced

~resident

~lilson

and his

foreign policy during 1915; the English attempt to blqck indirect
importa t ion to Germany which he Trvi olently oppos ed" in a seri es of
notes, the

~erman

war zone around England when he informed the

German governrrent he would hold them to "strict acco untao iIi ty",
and the sinking of the Lusltania.
1

Baker,

OPe

ci t., Vol. 5, p. 218.

2

Dulles ani Armstrong,

OPe

ait., pp. 26-27.
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It did not take tlE British long to reach the conclusion
that the sappression of

o~r

trade with

Germany~

was an imperative

necessity. As Lord Grey stated: "The object of British diplotnacy,
therefore, was to secure the maximum of blockade that could be en1

forced

\\'i

thout a rupture with the United states."

Even if the law

had been di fferent or our previous policy a reversal of this action,
it is do ub tful il the Bri tis h wo uld have relaxed thei I' hold upon
neutral commerce. They were fighting for the ir

vel~y

lives; and to

2

them American profits were a

~inor

consideration.

British restrict-

ions hurt both American pockets .and American pride. Britain countered our notes by playing a delaying game. and the strategy was perfect and, what is more, the United States played the nritish game.
The longer the State Department deferred pushing matters to a showdown, the more perfect the British strangulation of Gennany became
and more closely the United States was bound by economic ties to
the Allies, and the greater the cm.nce that the German submarines
3 .
wo uld dri ve the co 1111 try to war.
It has frequently been alleged that the United States
could have forced the Allies to respect its rights by instituting
an embargo on war materials. ,Such a course was repeatedly proDosed,
but it met with considerable apathy. As the weeks passed by, the
1

Grey, Ope cit., Vol. 2, p. 213.
2

Bailey,

OPe

ci t., p. 617.

3

Ibid. p. 619
War iiemories of Robert Lansing, p. 112.
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American economic structure gradually became so inextricably interlaced wi th the cause of the .Allies that public opinion would not
have tolerated. an embargo.

Literary Digest poll, even at this

A

1

early period, showed the industrial centers against such a move.
The United States to ole a position which was logical ani which
fitted both the sentimental and the natioml interests of the country, mmelY1that we were under no duty arbitrarily to rectify the
consequances of Dritish control of the sea. We wouli trade where

•
we cOUld, and thus flll
the gaps caused by the loss of trade with

.

Ge rJJany , whose ports, as well as the ports of neighboring countries,
were largely closed to us as a result of the extension of the contraband list and the doctrine of cont inuous voyage. Further we considered it ob ject iom ble as a

1m tter

of principle to change what

we conceived to be the rules o:f neutrality during the course of the
war. Thus Secretar.r Bryan wrote to Count von

~ernstorff

on April

21, 1915:
" •••• any change in i t~ ow n la ws of
neutrality during the progress of a war,
which would affect uneually the relations
of the United States with the nations at war
wo uld bean unj ustifiable depart ure from the
principles of strict ne utrali ty ." 2
The United States had no objection to selling arms and
ammuni ti on to Germany; b at if she co uld not import them because of
1

Lit. Dig., L, 6 (Feb. 6, 1915) p. 225.
2

"Papers reJating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.
1915, Supplement, The World -dar, p. 162.
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n

the British navy. that was one of the misfortunes of war. In short,
an embargo on munit10ns would favor t:rennany; the absence of om
would favor the Allies. So the United States followed the profitI

able path of least resistance.
Tm governrrent therefore cont inue d to pursue a policy
that violated the true spirit though not the strict letter of neutrality; bound the nation even tighter to the wheels of tho Allied
.economic cha.riot; and so inf1amed the German mind as to provide
a partial justification-- to :the Gennans at least-- for unrestricted submarine warfare. Therefore.

~hen.

Gennany in February 1915

proclaimed that the waters surrounding Great Britain were to be
considered within the seat of war our answer was Wilson's "strict
accountability" note. Ne stated in that note that:
" • • •• the Gove rnme nt of the Uni ted States
wo uld be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a stri ct accountab iIi ty for
such acts of their naval authorities and to
take any steps it might be necessary to take
to safeguard American lives and property and
to secure to arne rican cit izens the full e nj oyment of their acknowledged rights on the high
seas."
2
There in a few words, is the thesis wrdch. logica,lly
3

purs ued, Ie d to war.

It was stated before the blossoming of the

I

Bailey,

Ope

cit., p. 623.

2

"Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,"
Supplement, 11he World War, p. 99 0
3

Dulles and Armstrong,

Ope

cit., p. 31 •
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"war boom" based on trade with the allies, and seven months before
the first Allied publi~ loan in this aountry. We were insisting
on what we ~imed to "be full enjoyment of aaknowledged rights.
Ih a note to Germany a few months later the same idea appears:
"The rights of neutrals in time of war
are based upon principle, not upon expediency,
and the prinaiples are immutable. It is the
duty and obligation of belligerents to find
1
a way to adapt the new ci rc umstances to them."
The sinking of the Lusitania had aonsequehces from whiah
German diploIIaay never recove,red. It brought the war home to a
,',

mass of Americans for whom until then it had been little more than
a moving picture. It made impossible any sort of understanding
between the Uni ted St[ltes and Germany as against Allied interferenae with neutral trade. It raised definitely and for the first
time the question of American participation in the war, and it
pointed unequivocally to Germany as the enemy of the future. Wilson
could have broken relations with Germany on the following day; he
wOllld ha,ve reaei ved a t llmul t of applallse from the Eastern states
2

aDd at least acquiescence from the rest of the aountry.

His hesi-

tancy was revealed in his "too proud to fight" speech, delivered
at Philadelphia, three 'days after the sinking. Wilson immediately
reiterated his statement of "striat acaountability" and asked
\

the German government's disavowal and the reply to Wilson, September,
1

"Papers relating to the Foreign ~elations of the United States,1915, supplement, The World War, p. 481.
2

Seymour, Am. Dip., pp. 89-90.
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)
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)

1915, prom.ised no more sinkings without warnings, although
negotiations dragged oh into 1916. The severity of the seoond
note oaused the resignation of Seoretary of State Bryan.
Wilson's firm stand in his seaoni note was proof that
he was slowly rejeoting the paoifist attitude and that his. patienoe
was wearing thin. With the exoeption of the West, the newspapers
1
were loud in praise of his aotion.
The loss of the British liner Arabio, Augllst 19, 1915,
folllld Seoretary Lansing

seri~.llsly

oonsidering the severanoe of

diplomatio relations, bllt Wilson, seemingly determined to bring
2

about a peaae oonferenoe, either by persllasion or threats,

would

not approve the aotion, fearing the oountry would not sustain the
government. The out oome of the inoident was a Wilson viotory. "The
aountry is undoubtedly baok of me in t he whole na tter, and I feel
myself under bonds to it to show pa tienoe to the utmost. My ohief
3

puzz1e is to determine where patienoe oeases to be a virtue."
During the seven months after the sinking of the Arabia,
the German subms. rines re frained from killing Ameri oan oi t izens. But
a vast amount of suspioion and ill feelings was oreated in the
United States by the alleged ,maohinations of German seoret agents,
1

Lit. Dig., L, 25 (June 19, 1915) pp. 1449-1450,
2

Seymour,
3

Am.

Bai Ie y, op.

Dip., p. 130,
0
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particularly by their attempts to sabotage the munitions trade.
Other incidents inaluded the exposure of the Albert papers, the
recalling, by request of Dr. Constantin Dumba, the Austrian ambassador, charged with fotCenting strikes, and the recall by request,
of Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed, December 1, 1915, for overstepping diplomatic boundaries in regard to the war effort. Although
many of the alleged German plots were figments of fevered imaginations, the witch hunting hysteria that swept the country deepened
distrust of Germany, and further prejudiced the Anerican mind
l'

against the Central Powers.
As a result of the prolonged Lusitania negotiations am
internal disturbanaes it became clear to Wilson that if the war did
not come to an end, knerican participation was almost unavoidable.
Wilson's call for mediation, through his personal diplomat, Col.
liou.se, in January. 1915, and again one year later, was not the meddling of an interfering bu.sybody or the dream of an impractical
visiomry. It was based u.pon the need of escapging from the u.ntenable position of a neutral. Ending the war by negotiation or en2

tering the war were the only alternatives.

On his second trip to

Eu.rope, Col. liou.se, in his attempt to get a conference meeting of
the powers, virtu.ally pledged the United States to become a member
3

of the Allied coalition. He had been told to pledge MORAL forae.
1
2
3
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)
The attempt failed as neither side was desirous of peace at that
time.
The rejection of the peace

~lan,

especially by the Allied

powers, and the action of Congress on such bills as the McLemore
bill, which would have forbidden Americans to sail on contraband-laden British liners (the bill was sidetracked following a strong
message from Wilson) brought a lull in American action during the
perio~

from February to May, 1916. It was a period of watchful

waiting •
But the period of watchful waiting ended with the torpedoing of the channel

steam~Jthe

Sussex, March 24, 1916, with the

loss of Amer ican lives. Wilson's not e, asking Germany to disavow
was sent April 18, and the German reply, pledging restriction of
submarine warfare, arrived May 4, 1916. It was a victory for Wil ...
son. He averted hostilities, maintained Arnericanprestige and forced the Germans to emasculate their most effective sea weapon.
But he took such a position that it would be virtually impossible
honorably ,to avoid war if the Germans should reopen their unre1

stricted submarine warfare.
The same month (May, 1916) 135,000 people throughout the
nation marched in "Preparedness Day Parades." Wilson carrying a
flag led the Washington parade. This was Wilson's appeal to the
general public, as he bad already appealed to Congress (Dec. 8,
1
I bid.) p. 636.
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1914) stating that provision for woluntary military training would

be extended, and that the organized militia of the states should be
developed and strengthened. The war in Europe had proved the failure
of a small army and Wilson wanted an improTement in our militia,
1

without oonscripti on.
During the nine months following th'e so-called Sussex
pledge, the German subIIf.l.rines were on their good behavior as far
as the United States was oonaerned. Amerioan publio opinion was
therefore left free to

on the aoo Ulllula tion of grie-

0 once~trate

vanoes, old and new, at the hands of Britain. Partioularly galling
I

was the British praotioe of opening the United States mail, in
searoh of oontraband being sent to Germany. 'l'he resentment of the
Amerioan people was further inoreased when it as alleged that
trade seorets were being filohed from these letters and turned over
to British commeroial rivals. Then on July 18, 1916, oame the
British blaoklist, oomposed of 85 persons or

fi~ns,

with whom the

British were not to trade. This aot angered the nation; even
Wilson and the oabinet. The protest of th6 Washington government
"

against the blaoklist was based on international morals rather than
on international law, for Britian had an undeniable legal right to
2

forbid her subjeots to trade with firms in the united States.
The Demooratio Convention meeting in St. Louis, June 14,
1

Lit. Dig., LII, 22 (May 27, 1916) p. 1518.
2

Bailey,

OPe
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1910, se1eoted President Wilson to once again head the ticket. Backed by the slogan, "He kept u.s out of war," the oonvention attempted
to make peace the theme of the oampaign wi th diplomaoy the weapon
instead of war. The election campaign submerged the war issues on
the sea. vVilson10f cou.rse, lE.d promis ed nothing. The slogan referred
only to the past, and was historioally true, but there were those
who felt that the slogan was a tacit pledge which Wilson was morally
I

bou.nd to ohserve.
The Repu.blicans, me,eting in Chicago, selected a Ju.stice
of the Supreme Cou.rt. Charles Evans

Hugh~S,

as his opponent, al-

thou.gh they failed to uake a conc.ete stand on the war situation.
Obviou.sly Wilson would head the ticket even if the politicians did not like him; apart from negligible elements alienated by his foreign policy, the rank and file were for him. Indeed,
he was reco gnized to be stronger than his party, and it was ass u.med
by Democrats that he would draw heavily from the Progressives and
from the independent vote. Starting with a somewhat archaio Jeffersonian equ.ipment of political principles, and under the suspicion
of being a cloistered doctrinaire and amateur, he had proved himself a practioal and adroit politician, and adept at divining the
trend of pu.blio opinion, and a statesman oapable of infu.sing the
radioal democratio impulses of Bryan into the idealistio program
I

Ibid" p. 638 0
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I'

,

'

1
of the mcxlerate progressives.

Hughes, the Republiaan aandidate,

hoped to bring baak the Progressives who had split off in 1912, and
most were ready to follow Teddy Roosevelt baak into the fold. The
elder Henry

MOrgenth~,

writing in his book, All in a Life-Time)

remarks oonaerning the pessimism of the Demoarats:
"1 spent the first few days after my
return to the United States wi th my old politiaaI friends in Washington and 1 was shoaked
at the prevailing poli t ioal atmosphere. Not
one of the nU:'~lerous. men high in the administration with whom 1 talked had the slightest hODe that President Wilson aould be reelected that fall." 2
Hughes mde many criticisms of Wilson's oonduot of foreign affairs. but his own policy was never clear. He was strong
in the north-east. Where pro-ally

senti~ent

was strong. but he

failed to gain many German votes or to offset the Demoarat's
slogan; "He QVilsot!] kept us out of war." The final outcome was
alose. New York went Republican, but the returns from the west
finally sW'ng the tide to Wilson.
1

Ogg, OPe cit., iol. 27, p. 374.
2

Baker, Ope ait., Vol. 6, p. 34.

The Democratic victory was accomplished by inroads on
Repllblican strength among the farming pOPllla ti ons of the newer
states. These inroads were easy to maKe, for the reason tJ::at these
pe ople regarded the President as a genlline pro gressi ve, and because
they thoroughly approved his pacific foreign policy; Hughes, they
cons idered to bet he candidate of a party domina. ted by reactionaries ani jingoes. The much feared "hyphen" vote failed to materialize. He had avoided war with Germny. Of seven states containing
the largest numbers of German-Americans, the Democrats carried
1

three.

'

Wilson was aotually more

favorabl~

to Germany than the

leading Republicans, espeoially The od,ore Roosevel t.
Following his reeleotion, aocording to Mrs. Edith Reid,
a close:friend of Wilson's, the president again was determined to
bring about peaoe in Ellrope, if possible. "Now the bllrden upon me
is heavier than ever," he stated. "If we oan esoape entering the
war and bring about a rational peace it is something worth living
and

d~ing

for, and I believe the oountry feels that way or it
2

would not have re-elected me."

But we must remember there might

be times when the oompletion of a rational peaoe might require
war.
Shortly ,follOWing the election Germany made a move for
a compromise peaoe, but the Allied answers showed peaoe impossible
1
Ogg"
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ci t.

t

Vol. 27, p. 381.

2

Millis, OPe cit., p. 354.
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withont a decisive victory. Although Wilson had promised Germany
1

to move for peace immediately following his re-election,

he waited

until after the Gennan move, in the middle of December, to begin
the writing of his peace notes, at which time (December 18) he
2
sent identical notes to all the belligerent nations. The pnblic
reaction to Wilson's ,mOTe followed the general pattern tha. thad
prevailed thronghout the country following his previous attempts
at mediation; a pro-Ally east, a neutral mid -west,a disinterested
3

west and a drop on the stock exchange.
The German answer was at first evasive and the Allies
refu.sed to bargain without the certainty of reparations, cleverly
concealing their answer, and realizing their goal of inciting fav4
orabl~ public reaction in the United States.
On January 22, 1917, Wilson gave his reaction to the
replies of his peace message, in his "peace without victory" ,speech
to Congress and at the same time asking for a League of Nations to
preserve peace in the fnture. It was a last desperate attempt to
win peace for America. It was the final stage of .America.n neutrality.
1
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But Wils on was too late, for on January 8, 1917, the Emperor of
Germany had secretly promulgated an order for unrestricted submar,
1
ine warfare. Vfuen Josph P. Tnmulty, Wilson's secretary, delivered
the Associated Press bulletin announcing Germany's resumption of
unrestricted warfare, January 31, 1917, Wilson stated, "This means
2

war •••• "

The German not e, announcing tha t a blockade was to be

placed around the British Isles, showed tmt Germany realized .peace
was impossible. The British Ambassador, with his ear to the ground,
reported; "War has drawn 'gradually nearer and nearer to the United
.
3
States in s'pite of all their efforts."
The announcement of the blockade around the British Isles
brought forth a rupture in diplomatic relations and on February 3,
1917, Count von Bernstorff was handed his passport. In a statement
issued to the press, Berostorff said: "I am not surprised. My government will not be surprised either. The peonlein Berlin knew
what was bound to happen if they took the action they have taken.
4
There was nothing Ie ft for the Unit ed States to dO." The Wall
Street Digest not ed that the "upward movement in the pri ce of stocks
, I

dates from the day the German Ambassador was banded his passports."
1
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Throughout 1916 the news of German victories or peace offers bad a
most depressing effect on the stoak mrket. These facts,*ogether
with the rejoicing in financial circles over the break with Gennany,
indi cate the cl os aness of t he economic rela ti onship between the
1
United States and the Allies.
After the rupture of relations with Germany, war was virtually inevitable. Yet Wilson hoped against hope that the Germans

ari. overt aot against the United States. But if their

might avoid

submarines again destroyed

~rioan

ships and lives he would oorre

before Congress again and recommen~ extreme measm~es. This was a
wise deoision, for publio opinion in the United States was far from
unanimous on the desirability of war.

If

I oould not move faster,tt

Wilson remrke d to his secretary, "than the nass of our people
2
wo uld permit. n
The exposure of the Zimmerman note. February 24, 1917,
came as something of a shock to Amerioans to realize tmt Germany)
if struck by the United States, would strike back in the New
World. Immediately a

tremend~ous

wave of anti-German sentiment

swept over the country, particularly in the hitherto apathetio
south and southwest, where there was alarm over the threat of
being conquered by Mexioo. Nor was the immigration-oonscious
1

Peterson,

OPe

oit., p. 267.

2

Bailey,

Ope

cit., p. 642.
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Paaifia aoast pleased by the proposed overtures to Japan. A more
1

nearly united .Ameriaa was now one step nearer the brink.
On February 26, Wilson urged Congress to authorize the
mounting of guns on Ameriaan me ramnt ships bound for European
waters. calling it "armed ne utrali ty," am, realizing that fur ther
aation by Congress was needed. aalled a s

p:l

a ial sessi on far Apri 1
,

6,1917 • .A. filibuster halted the request in Congress, but the aation
was aarried out Maran 4, through military powers of the exeautive
2
offiae and expert gunners wer,e to be supplied by the Navy. The
,

sinking

"

0

f two unarmed merahant. ships, Marah 12 and 19, only added

tot he 0011 for war.
The Zimmerman note and the aatualsinkings aonvinaed
Wilson that peaae was hopeless. The pressure on Wilson to request
Congress to dealare a state of war aame from many sides and espeaially from people prominent in everyday affairs.
between Germany and the United States aatually

A

state of war

eXisted~

said viae-

president Marshall in a speeah at Montgollle ry. Alabama, on the 24th.
This opinion was eahoed by Charles E. Hughes, Elihu Root and
I

Theodore Roosevelt. "There is now a state of war, and the people of

I

1
~

Ibid.I p. 643. .
Lit. Dig., LIV, 4 (March 17, 1917) p. 687.

I

Millis,

OPe

ait., pp. 404-405.
-14'1-

the United States should recognizetbe fact." said Mr. Hughes.
"GerrIRny is naking war on us and our reply mus t be ei th er war or
submissi on." affirlmd Mr. Root. Colonel Roosevelt, after pointing
out that Germany "had steaily waged war upon us" ever since her
declarat ion of unrestri cted su bmarine war on Jan uary 31, added:
"Let us face the accomplished fact, admit that Germany is at war
with us, and in turn wage war on Germany with all our energy and
courage and regain the right to lmok the whole warld in the eyes
1,2
without flinching."
,

,

Wilson's message to Congress, April 6, 1917, was greeted
with wild ovation. Of the 50 negative votes in the House (373 to
50), 32 came from Republieans-- mostly of the western progressive
wing-- one was that of an independent and the remaining one that
of Meyer Lonion, the Soc ialist member. There were, altogether, 520
Senators and Representatives; only 56, or about one in ten, had
3

dared to cast their votes against the tide.
But if one dares to trust Mr. Tumulty's memory, there
was another scene in the White Hoase that night, when the

secre~

tary talked alone with his chief in the Cabinet room. The applause
1

Lit. Dig., LIV, 12 (March 24, 1917) p. 801.

2

Roosevelt, Theodore: Fear God and Take Your Own Part, p. 203.
3

Cong. Rec., 65th Cong. Special Session, Vol. 55, pt. 1. p. 420.
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from the sidewalk orowds as he had dri ven from the Capi tol retllrned to the President's ears. "My message today," Tllmlllty remembers him say, "was a message of death for our young men.
How strange it seems to applaud that." Afterward, in the seoretary's account. the President broke down and wept, with his head
1
on the Cabinet table.

It might have seemed logioal for the United States to
, j

have deolared war against both groups of belligerents, jllst as it
had been proposed that she fight both England and Franoe in 1812.
A logical answer was that Allied praotioes hurt only
An:e r ioan property right s. The Uni ted States

00

uld lodge pr"otests

and perhaps oolleot, damages when the war was over. The German submarine took Amerioan lives and there seemed to be no proper reoompense for lives. So the United States fopght Germany. As the Boston Globe rermrked: "One was a gang of thieves; the other was a
gang of murderers. On the whole we prefer the thieves but only as
2

the lesser of two evils."
Whether right,ly or wrongly, Wilson followed the oourse
of insisting upon the stri ot Ie tter of the law-- at least as far
as the Germans were conoerned and when Germany felt impelled to
act oontrary to these "immutable principles" ani "aoknowledged
1

Tumlllty. Joseph P4 : Wo<Xlrow Wilson as I know Him, p. 256.

2

Bailey, op. oit., p. 645.
-149-

rights" war 1lecarre imvitable. We had admitted the law of necessity in our earlier notes to Great Britain where trade only was
involved; but we did not recognize that the law of necessity could
be inVOked to just ify putt ing the lives of our ci ti zens in jeop1
ardy. Secretary CJf State Eobert Lansi~, said on June 9, 1915:
"But the sinking of passenger ships
invo 1 ves principle s of humanity which throw
into the background any spedlial circumstances
of detail that nay be thought to affect the
cases •••• The government of the United States
is cant endi ng for SOIm th ing much greater than
mere right s of prop.erty or pri vileges of oommeroe. It is oontending for nothing less high
and saored than the rights of humanity, whioh
every government honors itself in respeoting
and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and
authority." 2

, I

These grave words, and the aots to which they were the
prelude, sh ow us tha t in t he last analysis it is the attack on
human life, rather than the attack

OIl

property rights, Which is

most likely to start in motion the tides of resentment which can
. impelrs country like the United States ihto war. But perhaps
the decisive factor was sympathy-- gradually

shiftil~

to the Allied

cause.
Nearly everyone, even Theodore Roosevelt in September,
1914, thought .it "eminently desirable" to remain neutral. It was
not until some months later that Roosevelt accused Wilson of "pol1

Dulles ani .tirDlstrong,

OPe

cit., p. 31.

2

"Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,"
1915, Supp1elmnt, The World War, p. 481.

,.
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troonery" for not having protested the invasi on of Belgium. His
ohange of mind is not attributable mainly to politioal motives,
though his love of politi oal inveoti ve undoubtedly played a part.

Wba t happene d to him, wm t happened to Pres ident wils on, happened
to mny other .dmericara, some sooner, some later. 'l'hey saw a
battle royal in progress, and in their hearts thew took sides.
Then, as

t~

posi tion which our governmont had taken from the

very out set prod uced the

IIR ter ial

and Ie gal gro unds fo r parti ci1
pat ion, feeling and faot ooal~soed; we participated.
"A government can be neutral," said Water Hines Page,

2

"but no man oan he."

-0-

1

Dulles ani Armstrong,

OPe

oit., p. 33.

2

Hendriok,

Ope

Cit., Vol. 1, po 3610
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